The current balance of power in open models

I was recently invited to brief a group of Congressional members and staff on the state of open-weight models in the lens of U.S.-China competition. I’m sharing my prepared remarks as a state of the union on open models that is accessible to a broader audience.
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Recap: What is an open source v. open-weight vs. closed model?
Open language models are AI models where their weights are publicly available for inspection or downstream use. These are most often contrasted to so-called “closed” AI models. Closed models offer access only through Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) that developers can use to directly query a model, like GPT-4 or Claude Opus 4.5, or through products, like ChatGPT and Claude Code.
Open language models primarily are bucketed into two categories, open-weight and open-source models. Open-weight models are the most common form, such as popular models like Meta’s Llama, Alibaba’s Qwen, Google’s Gemma, or DeepSeek’s models. These models are governed by licenses, governing documents dictating what is allowed with downstream use, and are often accompanied by inference code in libraries such as Transformers, VLLM, SGLANG, etc. Since about April 2025, Chinese AI companies have been the clear leader in open-weight models.
True “open-source” models are similar to these, as they include the weights, licenses, and inference code, but they also include the complete information needed to reproduce the model – the training code and training data. The most prominent open-source models have been built in the United States, led recently by the Allen Institute for AI’s Olmo models that I helped build in my recent 2.5 years there. The other prominent open-source models are also built by American non-profit organizations, including OpenAthena’s Marin models and EleutherAI’s Pythia models.
Open-weight, open-source, and every other label for a model – including closed models primarily offered via an API – exist on a spectrum. For example, Nvidia’s Nemotron models are far more open than most open-weight models, releasing large quantities of their training data under permissive licenses, but they’re not fully open-source because they do not release all of the data. Closed models also exist on a spectrum (arxiv.org/abs/2302.04844) based on what information the API reveals and the terms of use.
The state of competition between American and Chinese open-weight models (unit economics, technical capabilities, etc.)
We are living in a world where GLM-5.2 (interconnects.ai/p/glm-52-is-the-step-change-f…) and Kimi K3 (interconnects.ai/p/kimi-k3-the-open-weights-es…), some of the latest, leading Chinese models, have enacted a step change in the commercial viability of open models — crossing a similar threshold in agentic capabilities that Anthropic’s Claude Code crossed in December of 2025.
America was the early leader in open language models, primarily through Meta’s Llama models, which were used extensively across research and commercial tasks. Chinese open-weight models surpassed American open-weight models in these two key areas about 18 months ago. The simple metric showing this is Hugging Face Downloads, where China took the lead in July of 2025 primarily through the success of Alibaba’s Qwen models. I personally maintain tools to track this data, and since I first published the American Truly Open Models (ATOM) Project (atomproject.ai) in August of 2025, China’s download lead has grown to about 1.6B (dashboard.interconnects.ai/?downloads=region.c…) – with a total of 3.2B downloads, twice that of America’s total.
On popular capabilities benchmarks, such as the Artificial Analysis Intelligence Index (AAII), the Chinese open-weight models have a clear lead over American counterparts. The top three Chinese models as of writing this on September 14, 2026 are Z.ai’s GLM-5.3 and GLM-5.3-Flash and Moonshot AI’s Kimi K3 with scores of 45, 42, and 44 respectively. By comparison, the leading American models are Thinking Machines’ Inkling and Inkling Small, both with a score of 26, and Nvidia’s Nemotron 3 Ultra, with a score of 23. The top American models were released in June and July of 2026, and are updated less frequently than their Chinese counterparts. For example, Chinese labs released models with scores above these American models 2-6 months before the American companies got there (e.g. GLM-5 or DeepSeek V4 Pro). There is a trend of more American companies releasing models, including names like Arcee AI, Poolside and IBM, but they are not rapidly closing this performance gap. Other benchmarks tell a similar story.
Together, Chinese open-weight models are approximately 2-5 months behind the closed American frontier, with the open-weight American models being approximately 6-9 months behind the likes of OpenAI and Anthropic. The Chinese labs are closest in tasks with clear user demand, such as agentic coding, and further behind on more open-ended scientific tasks, such as physics or biology.
The reasons why Chinese labs can produce these strong models, despite having fewer resources than American counterparts, is still an open debate and heavily influenced by different work cultures (interconnects.ai/p/notes-from-inside-chinas-ai…), but is also influenced by a few key technical factors. The Chinese labs release their models faster and focus on a slightly narrower distribution of tasks, flattering them slightly on public benchmarks. Releasing faster helps them score higher because all the labs are making consistent progress, so once you “finish” a model to be released, it is a snapshot of performance at that given time — labs where that time is later tend to score higher. Still, the models built by the Chinese labs are genuinely strong and represent real competition to the American industry. This competition will not decrease meaningfully as the closed labs patch vulnerabilities in their API offerings which enable distillation.
Distillation is most impactful in new domains and does not make it trivial to create a universally strong final model. I estimate that if distillation was fully prevented, e.g. with know-your-customer (KYC) tools at Anthropic and OpenAI, the gap from the strongest American models to Chinese open-weight models would only increase by 1-2 months.
For example, the Chinese labs are rapidly changing their posture towards paying for training data in 2026. Earlier in the year, the top Chinese labs including Moonshot AI and Z.ai (z.ai) had a strong preference towards building data workflows in-house, but by the summer they had begun to buy the cutting edge data – challenging RL environments for agentic tasks – from both established American companies and new Chinese startups.
With the advance of open weight models in China towards the frontier of capabilities, and the recent documentation of growing risks around frontier models in areas such as cybersecurity (e.g. the OpenAI-HuggingFace incident (openai.com/index/hugging-face-incident-and-the…)), there’s growing regulatory uncertainty on how continued releases can enable a safer ecosystem?
A structural challenge in open-weight models is that there are few effective methods for stopping pieces of open software from reaching bad actors. If an attempt was made to restrict access to the strongest open-weight models from China because they amplify risks, the parties who would be set back are American businesses. We have an example of this – HuggingFace used a Chinese open-weight model to understand the cyberattack (huggingface.co/blog/security-incident-july-202…) because closed models would not answer their requests. Thus, managing the risks of open-weight models often comes down to …