Catching up with the Status of Kurdish Groups in Iran

Hi, everyone, and welcome to the show.

I'm very lucky to be joined again today by Vladimir Van Vilgenberg, who's a repeat guest, longtime journalist and reporter on Kurdistan, and a very excellent source for this stuff.

How are you doing today, Vladimir?

I'm doing well, thank you. Thank you for this opportunity to be interviewed again by you.

Yeah, of course. Thank you for your time, and thanks for staying up so late.

I guess, like, To begin with, we should recap the situation of Rojelati Kurdish groups, armed groups specifically, right?

Who they are.

And I realize we could take an hour to just explain who they are.

Yeah.

But like, can we briefly explain to people who they are and for the most part, where they are right now?

So basically, this Iranian Kurdish opposition parties, they have been active for a very long time.

I mean, they have a long history.

Yeah. in fighting with the Islamic Republic, and most of them, they were exiled a few years after they were military defeated by the Islamic Republic after the Islamic Revolution in 1979. And since then, they have been exiled in bases and camps in Iraqi Kurdistan. It's a large number of Iranian Kurdish parties. So if I would mention all the acronyms, you'll be very confused. But there's a number of them and they have camps around the province of Erbil and Slemani.

And they have been targeted several times, hundreds of times during this February war. And there were around 19 people, members of the Iranian Kurdish parties. They were killed by Iranian drone strikes and missile strikes during this war. And currently they are sort of stuck in between because Iran is demanding that they are removed from Iraqi territory. And then you have the Iraqi Kurds that don't want to be seen selling out Iranian Kurdish fellow Iranian Kurds by force.

kicking them out or giving them to Iran. So the Kurds are a bit stuck in the middle. And then you also have the withdrawal from the US-led coalition. Although the US-led coalition was mostly defending the US bases, they were not defending Iranian Kurdish parties, but sometimes they were taking out some drones or missiles that were going into the direction of Iranian Kurds, but that could have also gone into direction of, for instance, the consulate or the coalition base that is not there anymore.

So that's like sort of an overview.

Yeah, I think that's a good overview. And so we're now in this position, right? Where these groups have bases close to the border, but in the Iraqi part of Kurdistan and the Iranian part of Kurdistan for the most part. But in recent days, people maybe will have seen that there has also been some conflict with one of these groups inside of what is now Iran, right? Can you explain a little bit of what's going on there and who...

who the actors are in that case.

Yeah. So I was telling you about the acronym soup of Iranian Kurdish factions. Um, but one of the factions that have been active is, which actually is an affiliate of the Kurdistan workers party from Turkey, which is engaged in a peace process with Ankara. So there have been some clashes. with Peshawar using drones in response to Iranian operations in the border areas of Iran, which is actually very close to the area where they have bases inside Iraqi Kurdistan, near Panjshir, in Halabja province, on the border of Iran. So they have underground caves there and tunnels, and they have people there. And since also the February war, there have been some occasional clashes between both sides. There

was also a ceasefire actually between Peshawar and Iran in the past, which was brokered by Iraqi Kurds. But despite of the ceasefire always, even before the current war between the US and Iran, there was always tensions between Peshawar and Iran. And recently also there was a death sentence for one Iranian Kurdish activist close to the Peshawar and Iran recently. reaffirmed the death sentence for that female activist.

So there are still sort of these tensions on the border. And Peshawar is also one of the few Iranian Kurdish factions that has a lot of experience with drones. And that's also due to their links to the PKK and also to the SDF. So the PKK and the SDF are basically the brother and sister parties of the PKK.

They have this experience of fighting with drones. For instance, in Syria, the SDF fought with drones against the Syrian government And other factions and also the PKK, they have been using drones and they have been experimenting with drones in the last few years. But there's now a peace process between Turkey and Ankara since 2024. And the PKK has said, we're going to disband. So they are in this process. But at the same time, that leaves out what is going to happen with Iranian Kurdish brands, which is the Peshawar. Yeah. And now the situation is unclear what is exactly what's going to happen. Of course, we don't know if there's going to be new clashes between US and Iran. But at the same time, there have

been some clashes between this group, Peshawar and Iran. And there also have been assassinations carried out by Iranian Kurdish political parties against Kurds working with the Iranian government and also others.

So that's also have been like sort of a silent.

Small insurgency brewing in in the kurdish majority areas of iran but we should also not forget that this has always been brewing there have been always like movements and attacks and assassinations and protest movements for instance the jina amini protest movement that that erupted over the death of a iranian kurdish lady in iran by the morality police also sparked like this huge widespread protest which also spread through the kurdish areas and where Iran actually accused the Iranian Kurdish opposition parties of being involved in that. So, yeah, there have been always protest movements and unrest in Kurdish areas that were often ended with a crackdown by the Iranian state.

Yeah, like even in January, when we saw the biggest protests over the last couple of years, there were some, like I remember the PAK were posting videos of them, which is another of the acronym soup parties. we're posting some videos of them like shooting at police stations and it's like a rising falling tide.

Yeah. Yeah. Like in January, there were this anti-government protest that started in the bazaar of Tehran and Kurds mostly stayed out of these protests in January because also there was this idea that it was more monarchists that were involved in these protests. And, you know, the monarchists are also very strongly conservative. against any form of Kurdish autonomy so the Kurds mostly yes stayed out there was like I think one strike and you also had the PAK Kurdistan Freedom Party that was saying that they were carrying out some actions in some areas like around Kermanshah and and some other areas in that area around Kermanshah and Melekshah and some other areas so it was a bit confusing like if some of these reports were true, but

the Kurds in general were not very much involved in those protests as they were, for instance, in the past in the Jini Amina protest movement, where they were much more involved in, and in which also in response, Iran started to carry out drone strikes against Iranian Kurdish parties in Iraqi Kurdistan at the time. Yeah.

So, yeah.

And they continue to, like on the anniversary of Jinnah Amidi's murder, I can't remember if it was the anniversary of her murder or her arrest, but They called a general strike this year, right? And then the IRGC sent significant numbers of troops, even to block the route to her grave, if I understand correctly, so people couldn't gather there.

Yeah, and there was also a dispute again, which shows the disunity of the Iranian opposition about the father of Jina Amin using a Kurdish flag in a social media post.

Oh, yeah.

So it's also... The Iranian opposition is very much disunited, what we saw, despite the opportunities they had, which is very different, for instance, from the Iraqi opposition when the Americans moved to remove the Saddam Hussein regime. Despite all of the differences they had, the Shia, the Kurds, and some other Iraqi opposition parties, they sort of united at the time. But in Iran, we haven't seen. There were some attempts like that in the past, but they basically fell apart. Yeah, it also shows the disunity and the disorganization.

But it's also very difficult, of course, to organize an opposition in exile when you're not on the ground and also when the neighboring countries do not accept the presence of such groups on their territory, for instance, which is very different, for instance, if you compare Iran to Syria, where in Syria the Assad regime pissed off so many of its neighbors, so many of its neighbors, even if they were not completely 100%, actively supporting insurgent groups against Assad regime. Most of them were sort of tolerating it or allowing it to happen. So there was a lot of Gulf states and Turkey and other countries that supported basically the Syrian opposition against Assad regime. But for instance, in,

in Iran, we never had such a situation, even Turkey, despite that there's a large Turkish speaking ethnic group.

In Iran, you have the series and Turkmen. that you don't really have.

Turkey was not supporting the overthrow of the Iranian government, for instance, or the other countries neighboring Iran were not so much happy.

And even, for instance, the Iraqi Kurds were also not very.

Much happy to become a target by Iran for having such a campaign, for instance, against that you had all these reports that the U.S. and Israel were actively arming Iranian Kurds across the border. And then we saw statements recently, there was a forum, an annual forum in Arabia called the Miri Forum, where Iraqi Kurdish leaders were saying that this was a very bad idea and that they were against it, and that actually that the rival ruling Iraqi Kurdish parties, the PUK and KDP, they both agreed to basically close the border and to prevent any attack from Iranian.

Kurdish parties towards Iran.

And also that they coordinated on that fact, although they didn't even form a government yet, despite elections taking place in 2024. They both sort of saw the threat of such a plan from Iranian Kurds to move towards intervening basically in Iran.

And they really opposed that plan. And they also were ally in that in Turkey.

Turkey was also opposed in it because they were afraid of a second Rojava, you know, a second Kurdish autonomy on their border like what happened in Syria. Yeah. I mean, even in Iraq in the beginning when the U.S. overthrew the Saddam regime, Turkey was also opposed against the U.S. intervention because they were afraid of that. But now they sort of de facto accepted this Kurdistan region in Iraq.

But in Syria, it was much different. They never accepted it. Yeah. So that's why it's all interconnected to each other and it's very uh complicated.

Yes yeah yeah and like turkey is still making military incursions into the kurdistan region of iraq elected to defend or like defend its borders even though it like yeah it's de facto accepted that the krg you We should talk a little bit about how the impact of, like, specifically, actually, the impact of American journalism has been in this situation, right?

Because we had early on in the conflict, we had this report. I think there was a Barak Ravid thing, and then there was a Fox News thing, Barak Ravid works for Axios, about, like, oh, the Kurds are amassing at the border and they're ready to invade Iran, right? Or, like, even, like, people from Iraqi southern Kurdistan are preparing to, like, liberate their Kurds in eastern Kurdistan and Iran. And like that reporting had very real consequences for Kurdistan, right?

For Iraqi Kurdistan.

Yeah, obviously it made Iraqi Kurdistan more a target for Iran. And there were like 1,000 drone and missile attacks on the Kurdistan region since 28 February. Yeah. And you saw, for instance, that report of, I think it was Fox News reporter that was like posting on the next that saying that all the Iraqi Kurds are now like going towards the border and attack Iran. I'm not sure whether the information was coming from, but I think it was actually the opposite. This was probably the Iraqi Kurds going to the border to stop such an attack.

To seal the borders.

And that was actually revealed during this last forum, the MIRI forum in Erbil, where the Iraqi Kurds were actually talking quite transparent about all what happened, basically. And they were saying, actually, we sent people to the border basically to stop such a basically threat and to tell Iran, like, we are not a threat to our neighboring country. So I think, yeah, there was there was like actually some of the reporting made the situation worse. But also, I'm not sure if there were people in the Trump administration leaking that on purpose to undermine such plans to, for instance, use Iranian Kurds to attack Iran or because it was a fact that Iranian Kurds, they did get some support and there was some data that they received any weapons,

but the Iranian Kurds were sort of preparing for the potential scenario of getting like air support and moving into Iran and attacking the Iranian government. But then I think Trump, he changed his mind at the last moment. So in the beginning, Trump was saying like, it's a good idea. I think he told Reuters at the time, it's a good idea that the Iranian Kurds do that. And then later he said, Well, it's not a good idea. I think they should not go into Iran and attack Iran.

It's not a good idea. There are good fighters, but they should not do that. So I think it was also like a lobbying effort by, for instance, the Turkish government. There was like a lot of reporting that the Turkish president, Turkish President Erdogan at the time, just directly called Trump and told him this is not a good idea. Don't do that. And one time also Trump, he said something weird, I think in a press conference, he was saying that if Turkey would have a choice to choose which side of the war they will be, they would rather be on the other side of the conflict. So I think with that, he indirectly sort of suggested that Turkey would be willing to intervene if, for instance, Israel and the U.S.

would support Kurds against the Iranian state. He didn't say that directly, but sort of I think it was more about that. I don't think that Turkey would intervene on behalf of Iran against Israel and the U.S., if there's not like a sort of thing that they fear, which is a Kurdish autonomy in Iran on its border, supported by the US and Israel. So I think it was like a reference basically to that, that they were, Turkey could have basically, that they were not really serious about it, but they were basically saying just what, for instance, in Syria in the past, when the US was supporting the SDF, at that time, Turkey said, well, US, if you continue to do that, we may be one day going to jump in and cross the border and attack the Syrian Kurds.

And you better find a way to get out at that moment. Like, because we're going to go one night, we're going to go and come into Syria. And that's actually what they did in the end. After a peace process broke down between Turkish Kurds and the Turkish state after 2015, they launched like three or four big Turkish cross-border military offensives.

And they're still there in Syria at the moment.

Mm-hmm.

So, yeah, and they did the same in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Well, there was no US support for the PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan, but Turkey also did like several military incursions for longer periods of time. And they actually increased their number of bases in the border areas in Iraqi Kurdistan and actually were able to remove some PKK positions from the area because of their superiority in drones that they have developed over the recent years, which is much more difficult for insurgents to fight against drones than against like.

Regular uh airstrikes yeah yeah definitely and uh and yeah we saw that in syria right like and very directly like i mean we can look at the the first trump administration and see like a phone call between trump and erdogan that leads to u.s withdrawal that leads to turkish attacks on syrian kurds like trump has previously expressed a lot of admiration for erdogan but like like everything else he kind of goes back and forth he also kind of At one point, he was speaking very negatively about Iranian Kurds, like making this statement that they had been supplied with weapons in January, that they had been stolen or sold. I forget exactly what he was saying.

It was a very strange press conference.

Yeah, he was saying that they stole the weapons.

And he was basically saying, like, Kurds are good fighters, but they fight only when they get paid and this kind of things, you know, so. Yeah. Yeah. Which was very confusing because as I mentioned at that time, there was not like a very big protest movement in the Kurdish areas. And also it would be difficult to get weapons to protesters in other areas because you have to cross this large territory. Yeah. Inside Iranian territory. Not that the Kurds don't have smugglers or something like that. There's a lot of cross-border smuggling of a lot of goods and stuff, you know, alcohol, which is banned in Iran and other stuff. I mean, it gets crossed over the border and But it would have been difficult just to

bring in large amounts of weapons into Iran and then give it to protesters. It looks nice on paper, but it's difficult if you don't have people on the ground. I mean, the US, they have also supported insurgencies in the past or other movements. For instance, the SDF, when the Syrian Kurds, for instance, were fighting ISIS, the US were dropping weapons by planes in crates. Some of the crates also ended up in ISIS hands because it's difficult to control the weather, you know, that they can blow up and saw somewhere else. But with Iran, of course, it's a very different picture, a very large country, hundreds of kilometers of border areas, mountainous areas, much bigger than Iraq, for instance. So if you don't have people on the ground,

it's difficult to, if there's not like a safe zone or something, or like an area where The Iranian military doesn't have control to give support to those groups. But Iran at the time controlled still all the territory of Iran. So if there's no area that some group controls, it's difficult. Yeah. And of course, the U.S.

Still lists the PKK in so much as PKK is still a thing. And the PJ, I'll try and not use the Kurdish way of pronouncing it, the PJAK as terrorist groups, as foreign terrorist organizations.

Yeah, actually Obama put Pajak on the list also, like PKK was already listed, but Obama at the time, I think because of the talks with Iran at the time that he gave them sort of a, maybe because there were some reports at the time also that Pajak was meeting with Americans. So maybe it was sort of a reassurance to Iran. Yeah.

And they haven't really changed their stance on that, but this leaves these Kurdish Iranian opposition parties in a very difficult position, right? Especially You sent me this thing today where an Iranian diplomat had said that they were being kicked out of southern Kurdistan.

Is that right?

Or handed over to Iran? I can't quite remember exactly what they said.

Yeah, so there was this agreement in between Iraq and Iran in 2023 after this Jinnah Amini protest that Iran was like convinced that the Iranian Kurds were involved in that. So after 2026, we saw that there was all these reports that Iranian Kurds were receiving arms and even the Iranian foreign minister, he talked about that in an interview, that he basically contacted the Turks and Iraqi Kurds to prevent that from happening. What Iran prefers is that those Iranian Kurdish opposition parties that have been in exile and in camps in Iraqi Kurdistan to basically be removed. For instance, what happened with the Mujahideen Halk, which was removed in 2016...

Because of Iranian pressure, but also because of the US that wanted them gone because they were creating issues. So Mujahideen Khalkh is also an Iranian opposition group and they have armed members and.

They were moved to Albania.

Yeah.

So Iran prefers something like that, that they are moved out to Europe or that they are surrendered to Iran. And that's also now actually a process now between the PKK and the Turkish government. Because Turkey is now discussing an amnesty for PKK. And they said, we're not going to accept the PKK leadership to come back to Turkey.

So where are they going to send them? So now they're talking about sending the PKK leadership, for instance, to Europe. Oh, wow. As part of this peace talks between the PKK and the Turkish state. So what we saw during this recent forum in the MIRI forum that the PKK leader, Bafo Talabani, he was an Iraqi Kurdish leader. He was saying, like, we can't do something like that with the Iranian Kurds also.

what is happening with the PKK, that we do something like that. And Iranian Kurd Salwood said, well, we don't have any talks with Iran or we have no idea what, there's no process at the moment going on. I mean, there were peace talks in the past between Iran and Iranian Kurdish parties, but in the beginning, actually Iran assassinated some of their leaders during these talks in Europe. And later they tried again in 2019. And there also have been talks between Peshawar and Iran. But some people say that was like mediated also by the Iraqi Kurds at the time.

This was around, I think, 2011. So, yeah, they have all this history.

But the fact is that the Iranian Kurds said, well, we are not aware of any talks. But it seems that the PKK leaders may be thinking that this PKK process with Turkey could be replicated with Iran and that then Iran stops its drone attacks.

Because, for instance, Turkey.

In the past, Turkey was carrying out a lot of drone attacks in Iraqi Kurdistan, also on Sinjar, on the PKK and PKK affiliates. And there were almost weekly drone attacks by Turkey. But once the peace process started after 2024, we saw around, I think it was around 2025 or before that, that almost all the drone attacks, they stopped basically.

So there was no more artillery, there was no more drone attacks by Turkey.

And I think that sort of the Iraqi Kurdish leadership sort of like thinking of, replicating that with Iran. But also today I saw an interview with an Iranian Kurdish leader who was saying that you should not like compare us to other Kurdish areas. We cannot be compared, the Iranian Kurds cannot be compared, for instance, with the Kurds in Turkey because that's a very different political issue. Also with this attacks, you know, like they're thinking of like replicating that, but the issue is that in Turkey you have PKK, you have the Turkish state, but in Iran you have like Kurdish political alliance of six parties. And then you still have some other Iranian Kurdish parties that are not part of the alliance. Yeah.

So you have like this large number of Iranian Kurdish parties, which.

Have maybe around 10,000 or more fighters. Some people say even more. So I think that's why it's a bit more complicated than in Turkey, because in Turkey they can talk with Ocalan who's in jail, the leader of the PKK. Yeah. But if it's with Iranian.

Kurds, who they talk to.

And the Iraqi Kurds are basically offering themselves as a, as a mediator, but the issue is then what you're going to do with all these different political parties. And then of course they want to have something in return.

So it's, it's, it's a complicated.

And at the same time, you have the Iranian ambassador in Baghdad saying, well, we already made a deal with Baghdad. They're going to be removed or given to Iran. And, and today there was also a KRG official and Iraqi Kurdish official who said that he was not a part of the meeting in Baghdad. So he has, he had no comment on that specific issue. Yeah.

So yeah, it's, it's like very, um, very complicated, the situation.

Yeah.

It's been such a fractured year, I guess, for Kurdistan, like starting with all the developments in Syria at the very start of the year.

And then like, I.

Feel like immediately following that we saw a lot more unity, like even to the point where there were like some P UK anti-terrorism forces who went to Hesika, I think like, like during that, that time when, uh, The STG was advancing towards a majority Kurdish cities in Syria.

I think there was a misunderstanding about that thing.

Okay. The PKK already had this counterterrorism forces for a long time in Syria, and they were basically already there. But then there was some social media that were suggesting that they were basically being sent to support the STF against the muskists.

Mm-hmm.

Uh, but I talked to people from the PUK side and they said, no, no, it was not, it was not like sort of, I mean, there was a lot of cross border solidarity, you know, Iraqi Kurds. Yeah. Supporting also dialogue between, uh, Syrian Kurds and Damascus, both from RBO and Slimani, but like actively involved in supporting like SDF military. I think that was only mostly against ISIS and not against, uh, Damascus. Okay. Okay.

So they were still there on that anti-ISIS mission, which was ongoing for them. Yeah, that makes sense, I guess.

Yeah.

It was interesting just to see the move to using not the SDF flag or the PYD flag, but the green, yellow, and red Kurdistan flag, right? And a sort of more unified moment for Kurdistan. And now we're sort of back in this place where the various states... that divide Kurdistan have been able to like fairly effectively play the interest and safety of one group against the interest and safety of another group.

Right.

Is that fair to say?

Yeah.

Yeah. I mean, there was a lot of cross border solidarity at the time, even the other rainy Kurdish party saying that they were willing to, uh, send their forces into Syria if they were to receive a request. So, and there were also a lot of volunteers coming like Iraqi Kurdish volunteers. They were crossing the border and they were there. But then, of course, the agreement was made and then the fighting stopped. So they mostly returned to Kurdistan.

It's not that anyone stayed there. No, yeah.

I think most of them definitely came home pretty quickly. So, like, going along now, this still happens every... Every month or so, someone on Twitter will be like, oh, the Iranian Kurds are going to rise up against the Iranian regime. I guess it's an easy way to generate revenue if you're one of those people who has the blue tick on Twitter now. And mostly it's people who have never paid attention to Kurdistan before and won't again. It's just a lie for attention. But it seems almost less likely than it was a year ago, right? The US has not really done much to assist them. The bombing that the US has done has not degraded Iran's capacity to suppress revolution internally. It seems like we're not moving any closer

to a situation where we're likely to see any kind of open conflict in Iran.

Is that a reasonable conclusion?

Yeah, I think like in February, when they started bombing in February, March, that the Iranian government was quite weak and especially the Kurdish areas. I mean, they were like basically. Iranian soldiers and IRGC, they were basically hiding in mosques and stuff.

They were trying to avoid airstrikes. So at that point, they.

Were very weak. So I think at that point, the ability of Iran to suppress any Iranian Kurdish insurgency would be very difficult. But the Iranian Kurds were basically waiting to see what the US and Israel will do and if they were serious and nothing happened. I mean, there were some airstrikes in Piran Shah near the border, but that didn't really materialize in anything. And then I think now that the question is like, doesn't Trump really want to have like a full regime change or is the fact that he rather is looking for that Iran just say like official, I mean, Iran already says we don't have a nuclear, we don't have ambitions for a nuclear weapon, but that's not enough for the us us. They want

Iran to stop all this, like, uh, nuclear enrichment and this kind of things and all these sites and stuff. They want to be, be destroyed or removed or whatever. So I think that's like the main goal of the US and Israel rather has the regime completely gone, but they cannot do it by themselves only. Yeah. I mean, the Israeli prime minister is talking about that a lot, but they cannot do it by themselves. Yeah. The question is like, if there's going to be a new round of strikes, conflict after or before the midterm elections in the US, how are they going to look? Yeah. But I think personally that Trump is not so much interested in, he was hoping that Iran would have like sort of a Venezuela effect. Yeah, I agree. Like they killed like

several Iranian top leaders. They killed the Supreme Leader. And they were thinking that the Iranian government would like quickly collapse and that they could like do something with Kurds and maybe install either monarchists or someone friendly, like someone in the Iranian government would basically surrender completely to US demands and that basically... They would have like a new Venezuela and all business would start and they could continue.

But they didn't realize that Iran is like a very ideological government. And it's not like Venezuela, which is a very different situation. And basically that idea was sold. to Trump that it would be quickly over but it was not over very quickly and now they're sort of stuck in this conflict that's not ending and could continue until even a new government comes and after new elections you know after And not even after the midterm elections, a very big chance that this will just continue, even not like a full scale conflict. And still there will be tensions unless there's like an agreement between the US and Iran. Yeah.

So it really depends on what will happen.

So I think personally that if the US will do something, probably it will be like, again, like a very big strike or something on energy or nuclear sites and stuff. But will it be like a ground invasion? No. I mean, it's not going to send ground troops anywhere. I mean, they could also do something, what they did with the Syrian Kurds, that you have this small special forces supported by airstrikes hitting the Iranian government and then pushing them out from certain areas, like what happened in Syria with ISIS.

But so far, I mean, there's no indication of that. So probably it will just be like a very big strike again all over Iran. And then again, you're going to have talks. But I mean... Just airstrikes are not going to remove the Iranian government if that is the strategy. And also it's very unlikely that Iran will make any concessions unless there's like a very big threat to the future of the Iranian Islamic Republic. If there's like a very big uprising or there's literally Kurds marching on taking Kurdish territory or something like that, something like insurgents taking areas like Baluch and Kurds and others. Yeah. There's really something that they think, oh, we're losing territory. For instance,

what happened when you had, for instance, the British and the Soviets in the long time ago, that they basically controlled certain areas of Iran and created an Azeri and a Kurdish republic. So at that time, Iran was basically partially occupied by the Brits and the Soviets at the time. So that's something they would, maybe then they would make concessions, but currently it's unlikely. So there'll probably be a stalemate.

There'll probably going to be more strikes. But the Iranian Kurds, for instance, if the U.S. and Iran reach a deal, then Iranian Kurds, they will probably be under more pressure from Baghdad, from Iran and Baghdad to basically be removed from Iraqi Kurdistan. Although it's unlikely that the Iraqi Kurds will just easily accept such a thing because there's also this pan-Kurdish national sentiment that, you know, that if you remove those Iranian Kurds without their approval or their acceptance...

That could also create like Kurds being unhappy to say, oh, why are you betraying the reigning Kurds, you know? But if it's like a peace process, what is happening now between PKK and Ankara, where the PKK itself is saying, oh, we're going to disband and we have these negotiations with the Turkish government, then it's going to be different. Right.

So it can like move into many, many directions. But of course, everybody doesn't know what is exactly going to happen. Yeah. Yeah.

I think it's important to keep an eye on this stuff. And I think it's good that we've given people a better basis to understand it because the reporting in the US media on it has not been great. And I think, yeah, as you said earlier, right, like sometimes the US will just refer to the Iranian opposition, but there really is no unity there. Like even after the killing of Jinnah Amini, like we had these big protests about the death of a Kurdish woman and the opposition cannot even agree on what her name is. Like they want to use her Persian name. And I think that's a pretty good indicator of like.

Where they are.

And like the Iranian monarchists cannot help themselves, but like go on Twitter and make like just extremely big, bigoted is the wrong word, but like it's very clear that they and the Kurds are not in the same place at all. And like that they don't consider any sort of Kurdish autonomy to be compatible with their goals whatsoever.

Yeah, well, actually, even Pahlavi, he was calling on the Iranian army to fight the separatists or something like that. And he didn't even control any territory on the ground. So, I mean, like, it's different from Syria, where you have this large Sunni Arab insurgent movements that were fighting against Assad's regime. They actually had manpower to fight against the Kurds, and they did several times, even before the fall of Assad. Yeah.

And then when they took over the Syrian state, then basically they put demands to the Kurds that you either integrate into the Syrian state or it's going to be war. And that's actually what happened. It ended up in a war in January. And in the end, Damascus won with support of Turkey. And also because the West abandoned their alliance with the STF and they choose Damascus because, you know, they want to send back Syrians from Europe to Syria.

And the U.S. wants to do business deals. So, I don't know, like, maybe Pahlavi had something similar in mind, you know. Although it was actually interesting that the Iranian foreign minister claimed that Pahlavi sort of have accepted to lose control over Kurdish areas in exchange for getting control over Iran's central state.

Interesting.

He was saying that in an interview. But that was never confirmed or denied by Pahlavi. And also, seeing his hostility towards Iranian Kurdish political parties and their alliances, you know.

Doesn't really look like that, that he sort of accepted such a thing.

Right. Because if it was like that, they could have formed a sort of Iranian opposition alliance, you know, between monarchists, Iranian Kurds, Mujahideen, this other group or other groups. But they never did. You know, there was never really a big alliance. But Iranian Kurds themselves, they formed an alliance and they also have some contacts with some other Iranian opposition factions. But it's still very much disunited.

Yeah, yeah. But I think that's helped everyone get a better sense of where things are at. If people would like to follow more of your work, you do a really good job of keeping people updated on Kurdistan all over. Where can they find you online if they want to do that? Well, I'm mostly active on X, basically. And I write for different outlets. I write for Kurdistan, Kronkow, New Region, Middle East, some other outlets. So there's a large number of them. But most of the stuff I always post on my X. So that's where I'm mostly active also. trying to follow the whole.

Regional conflict, which is ongoing, you know, and spreading to Yemen and other areas. Yeah.

What's your handle there if people want to find you?

It's basically my name, but with a V. So it's at the exit, it's like V-V-A-N-W-I-L-G-A-N-B-U-R-G. Yeah. It's easier to write it on the screen then.

Yeah, we'll put a link for people. There's a lot of consonants coming out of people. Thank you very much for your time this evening. I think that really helped people get a better grasp of how things are in Kurdistan. Thank you.

You're welcome. Have a good day.

It Could Happen Here is a production of Cool Zone Media. For more podcasts from Cool Zone Media, visit our website, coolzonemedia.com, or check us out on the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to podcasts. You can now find sources for It Could Happen Here listed directly in episode descriptions.

Thanks for listening.

Catching up with the Status of Kurdish Groups in Iran

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