Tech Won't Save Us· Folge 271

Can Europe End Its Dependence on US Tech? w/ Aline Blankertz

Donnerstag, 10. April 2025 · 48 min

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Paris Marx is joined by Aline Blankertz to discuss whether Europe is going to finally make a serious push to end its dependence on US tech and how different European interests are trying to take advantage of those debates.

Aline Blankertz is an economist working on digital policy. She currently works with Rebalance Now and was previously at Wikimedia Germany.

Tech Won’t Save Us offers a critical perspective on tech, its worldview, and wider society with the goal of inspiring people to demand better tech and a better world. Support the show on Patreon (patreon.com/techwontsaveus).

The podcast is made in partnership with The Nation. Production is by Eric Wickham.

Also mentioned in this episode:
• Aline published some thoughts (structural-integrity.eu/on-tech-sovereignty-ho…) on the push for tech sovereignty in Europe.
• Paris co-wrote a white paper (discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10202865) on digital sovereignty last year and more recently argued the US needs to feel the consequences (disconnect.blog/p/the-united-states-has-gone-r…) for its actions.
• If you want to apply to be the show’s producer, find more information here (techwontsave.us/producer).
Support the show (patreon.com/techwontsaveus)
Support the show (patreon.com/techwontsaveus)

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What I actually find interesting and surprising is that in Europe there's less talk about really going against this authoritarian turn which we're observing in the US, but it's more about how do we build counter power and this is then framed in in military and often nationalist terms.

The first is to get 100 new supporters over on patreon.com at the $5 tier or above. And if we hit that, then I'm going to start working on a new series on defense tech so we can dig into this growing relationship between Silicon Valley and the Pentagon, which is not to suggest that this never happened in the past.

Obviously, we know the degree to which Silicon Valley came out of a lot of defense funding and things like that. But there does seem to be a notable shift in this kind of very public embrace of the military, of the military-industrial complex, of nationalism. And I think that that is worth exploring, understanding of it better.

So we know what these tech executives are doing in this realignment, but also what they are trying to get from the US government and from the Trump administration and what that's going to mean for the wider world if that happens. And I'm happy to say that at least at the time I'm recording this, over 30 people have already helped us to meet that goal.

So we're well on our way to getting there. And if you want to make sure that we can make that series, go over to patreon.com slash tech won't save us, become a paid supporter, and help us hit our goal. The other one, a bit of a bigger goal, is to hit 150 supporters. And if I hit that, I'm going to work on a zine.

It's something I've always wanted to do for Tech Won't Save Us. It's something, you know, I don't have much experience with, but I think that it would be fun to do. And I think that it would be a good way to, you know, help to spread these critical ideas about the tech industry, right? To help people understand what is actually going on here in a different format.

And I think a lot of you listening to the show would really enjoy that as well. So those are the two goals. I'm hoping that you can help me hit this month. We're already well on our way to the first one. So as I said, go over to patreon.com slash tech won't save us if you want to help me do that. The other thing I would note quickly before we get into the episode is that Tech Won't Save Us is actually looking for a new producer.

You know, Eric has been with the show now for going on three years. Again, like it's hard to believe it's been that long. And it's been so great getting to work with him over that period of time. But he's actually taken on a new role as the Ontario reporter at Press Progress, a progressive media organization in Canada where he's already doing great work, and I'm really excited to see what this next step in his career is going to mean for him.

But that means we also need to find someone else to help us put the show together. So, you know, if you do have experience doing audio production, working on podcasts, find a link in the show notes with more information about that. And, you know, feel free to send over a CV. Now, with that said, this week's guest is Aline Blankhurst.

Aline is an economist working on digital policy who currently is with Rebalance Now and has previously worked with Wikimedia Germany. Obviously, with all of the tariffs and the threats coming from Donald Trump, it has only amplified this conversation about achieving digital sovereignty, about different parts of the world getting off their dependence on US technology.

And I would say if there's any kind of, you know, area of the world or block of countries that is closer to trying to achieve that or at least has the resources to really make an effort at it, it is probably Europe and the European Union. And so I wanted to talk to Aline about how those conversations are actually playing out over in Europe right now, the different debates that are happening, and how this attempt to get off US tech is actually being framed, right?

Is this actually an opportunity to imagine how things can be done differently? Or is it just an attempt to try to create European versions of some of the worst things that we have seen in the United States, something that we absolutely need to avoid. And so as the alliance between Silicon Valley and the Trump administration continues to move these conversations forward, and as those of us, you know, who are interested in this topic, who are interested in reducing the dependence on US technology that we kind of structurally have, keep advocating for this, we need to pay good attention to actually how these narratives are being seized by decision makers, by powerful corporate interests in other

parts of the world to make sure that we're actually moving toward, you know, a better form of technology and not just the same problems that we have seen in Silicon Valley recreated somewhere else. And I think Aline is the perfect person to discuss this with because of the perspective that she holds on this.

So I was really excited to have Aline on the show. If you enjoy that conversation, you can of course leave a five-star review wherever you listen to the show. You can share it to friends or colleagues on social media. And as I was saying earlier, now more than ever is a great time to support the show and the work that goes into making it.

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Thanks so much and enjoy this week's conversation. Aline, welcome to Tech Won't Save Us.

Hi, Paris. Thanks for the invite.

I'm very excited to speak with you. Obviously, we have colleagues in common, but there is this big discussion happening in Europe right now about the relationship with the United States, the reliance on American technology that was just kind of like taken for granted for so long. But now I think more and more people, and especially people in power, are questioning whether that continues to make sense.

And we're in this moment where I think it's important to be having these discussions and not just debating whether we should be trying to make these switches, but the way that push towards, say, a digital sovereignty or something like that is actually being pursued in the way that different interests are trying to frame it in different parts of the world.

So I think I would just start by asking you more of a general question, which is how is Europe reacting to the pressure that we're seeing from the Trump administration when we're seeing, say, Donald Trump making threats of tariffs against Europe, or we're seeing JD Vance come over and speak in Paris and Munich and really kind of tear into European culture and European society, not just kind of military spending and these kinds of things.

What is the response in Europe in seeing the way that the United States seems to have really changed how it views that relationship to the European Union and many European countries?

I would say that the response is quite mixed and people are really still coming to terms with what's happening because in the last few years the US has already signaled that it was moving in this direction, but really Trump is implementing this very, very quickly. And what surprises people is really this level of resentment we've seen in the signal chats, in the rhetoric about annexing Greenland from Denmark.

So really Europe is reassessing where it stands. And obviously, it's not a homogeneous actor either. Some people are now wondering like, where do we stand with regards to the US? And at the same time, they're still grappling with the Russian attack on Ukraine. China is a big topic. What many European politicians agree on is that Europe needs to invest, and what it has agreed on so far is that it needs to invest in arms, in defense, in security.

At the same time, a similar topic that I would say has been adopted by Trump. So while everybody says no, we don't like Trump, we don't like Musk, there are certain voices who pick up their themes, mostly regarding the role of the state. So there are also a lot of people echoing the claim, the demands for less regulation, less welfare, less migration.

Politicians have been less bound by democratic norms also in Europe, even though I would say it hasn't been as outrageous as in the US. But certainly Trump and Musk have shifted the window. So a lot of things that would have generated uh outcries in the past no longer do so. What I actually find interesting and surprising is that in Europe there's less talk about really going against this authoritarian turn which we're observing in the US, but it's more about how do we build counterpower?

And this is then framed in military and often nationalist terms.

That makes a lot of sense, yeah. Thinking about what you're saying from the Canadian perspective, it feels like over here, you know, we still want to hope that there's some ability to like rescue this relationship with the United States. But at the same time, it feels like the rhetoric and and the action has been so much stronger against Canada up to this point that it's like there is this kind of broad general realization, not just within the public, but within the political leadership, that this is fundamentally changed.

And even if we do have, you know, a new trade agreement or something with the United States, we can never rely on them like we had in the past. And so that is like a fundamental change. And it feels like looking over at Europe, it seems like there is that kind of debate as to like what is the future of their relationship with the United States.

And as you say, you know, that can differ depending on the part of Europe that you're actually in and, you know, kind of maybe the political influences that are there. But at the same time, it feels like because the action has not been as strong against Europe yet, maybe with the exception of Denmark and Greenland, that it's like maybe we don't need to do as much to antagonize the Americans yet.

Maybe they will still remain a bit more of a clearer partner. And it feels like from Canada, when we see that, it's like, no, like these people have fundamentally changed. You can't rely on them anymore. You should be more with us, and we should all be kind of working toward doing something without the United States.

But you can understand how building some kind of new world order or new alliance where the United States is is not an integral part of that is is very difficult, is going to be like economically difficult, socially difficult, going to require some degree of sacrifice. And if there's still a hope of kind of delaying that, it's like, yeah, we should take advantage of it.

But in the meantime, let's still invest a lot in the the military and arms and stuff, right?

Yes, there is so much interdependence globally, right? So finding new frameworks there is difficult. And obviously the US right now is using the way in which other countries and regions depend on them. And it's this weird coalition between the tech and the government elite, which is really raising a lot of new questions for European policymakers.

I'm gonna get to the tech aspect of this in just a second. But I feel like France has been kind of more vocally outspoken in needing to kind of create European military investment, European technology, like a broader European economy that's not so dependent on the United States. And it feels like France has been doing so for quite some time.

Of course, you know, its military has long been trying to not have that dependence on the United States. But it seemed notable that when the new German chancellor, Friedrich Merz, won the election, he kind of came out and very clearly said, I don't remember the exact words, but you know, that this relationship with the United States was fundamentally changed.

Do we see, you know, like a real shift happening within those major European powers that are really going to have a lot of influence on the broader European approach to this relationship with the United States and to whatever direction Europe takes next?

It's tricky because you have the different political forces even within countries. For example, in Italy, we've seen the different far-right parties taking a different position vis-a-vis Russia. In Germany, for example, the extreme right tends to be more cosy with Russia, which is different in other countries.

And also then the conservative parties have different positions here, and they are trying to now behave very strategically towards the US. Like nobody wants to burn bridges, but this erratic behavior by Trump is making it very difficult for people to somehow act strategically. This is also making it challenging to build reliable alliances within Europe, and it's not really clear what the aim is.

The big European countries, it's always easier for them to stand up and push for their interests. The German-French connection has been strong in pushing also for austerity and for making sure the southern countries don't overspend. This is also a topic right now because we're talking about defense across Europe.

While Germany has now agreed to invest 500 billion euros over the next few years in its military, certain southern states are more reluctant to take on national debt, and it's still not really clear who the enemy is, right? Like, is the US going to actually attack the EU? Like, who are we? I mean, this imaginary we, right?

Like, who who are we preparing us to defend us from? Like, this is really not so clear, and there isn't much debate, to be honest. Now everybody's just agreed, like, okay, NATO needs more money and more people and more arms in Europe, so we'll do that. Everybody seems to agree on that, but it's not quite clear where those arms might be needed.

No, I I definitely understand that coming from Canada as well, right? Canada is about probably a ninth of the size of the United States in terms of population. So the idea that if the United States decides to attack, that we might be able to realistically defend ourselves seems a bit maybe difficult or or far-fetched.

But at the same time, there's still this like growing desire and this growing public support for investments in military that we haven't seen in a long time because people do feel legitimately scared and threatened and are not sure what this former friend of ours is actually going to do, right? I think my final question here before we pivot to talking about tech more specifically is obviously within Europe, the real target of the Trump administration so far has been Greenland and Denmark more broadly.

What have other European countries made of the targeting of Greenland, Denmark in particular? And how are they kind of relating to that? Because as you say, you know, there's a real reluctance to burn these bridges if they don't have to be burnt. But at the same time, you're seeing a member of the European Union being targeted by the administration and the United States basically saying we want to take this whole chunk of territory that you have, regardless of whether they would actually want to join the United States in the first place.

So, what has been kind of the thinking on what is happening with Denmark and Greenland in particular?

I might not be aware of all the conversations going on there, but my impression is it's still this sense of like, what does this mean? What and how far are we willing to go? What I also find interesting, I mean, kind of learning a little bit from the experience with Russia as a more well-known aggressor, we are talking about military sanctions, but at the same time using economic sanctions has something that people have been quite reluctant to do.

Still, Russia has received more money from the EU in exchange for fossil fuels than Russia has received in military support. But that wouldn't really work in the same way towards the US. J.D. Vance just visited Greenland and they celebrated as a success that they managed to convince him to change his roots, which is like really we're back uh to the nitty-gritty of diplomacy where symbols make a big difference.

But I think it's really early to say what people would do if Trump just declared Greenland part of the US and somehow did something, or this is probably about resources. I think they are European politicians are still figuring out their strategies.

Fair enough, right? And just to be clear, J.D. Vance went to Greenland, you know, was kind of making all these wild statements about it, but was initially planning to go to like the south of Greenland and I believe Nook and places like that. But everywhere they asked to visit, they were turned down. And so they just went to the American military base that's in the north of Greenland and kind of stopped there and did their little speech and stuff and before leaving.

But it's absolutely wild to see these things. And you know, you bring up Russia and it's like we've been watching Russia say that it has a right to this territory in Ukraine for the past number of years, and then all of a sudden, to be seeing this kind of rhetoric coming from the United States as well that, oh, it should own Greenland, it should own the Panama Canal, it should own Canada.

There's something really, really shifting here. But I want to get to the tech side of this whole conversation, right? Because obviously this is a tech show, you know, and and this is what we're interested in. So I think I would start by asking obviously, we're seeing this changing relationship with the United States and this difficulty of kind of grappling with what that means for Europe and also many other parts of the world.

And one of the key pieces of that, of course, if we think about, you know, the present, is that so many of our societies, and and Europe is not immune from this, are so dependent on US technology, right? Not just on the consumer side with the platforms that we use and whatnot, but also, you know, these these things are built into so many of you know our government functions and the infrastructures that we rely on.

So, how dependent is Europe on US technology and why has it become so dependent on it?

European countries are extremely dependent on US tech companies. People have been feeling uneasy about this for quite a while. And now after JD Vance visited Europe, this has turned into fear. People are concerned about what might happen if US tech was turned off. This has happened over a couple of decades now.

It was always kind of looking at it as a question of do we build something ourselves or do we just buy the service which is digital, which is you don't see the physical manifestation so quickly, right? But now so much public infrastructure is running on the big tech clouds. So, like looking at hospitals, schools, public administration.

Nothing would work if big tech companies just said from one day to the other, hey, we don't like the way Europe is treating us. So just to demonstrate how powerful we are, we would switch it off. So now people are re-assessing what can be done. But obviously, there are so many path dependencies. You can't change that from one day to the next.

But at least people are now assessing where those dependencies exist. Also, companies are doing that, but they haven't gotten very far, I would say. At least in Germany, most of the attempts to create more sovereignty were really big tech products developed in conjoint with German partners and then sold with a markup to the same customers.

That's why we're having this debate. Now uh people want to develop different alternatives.

Is there a good reason why European countries and European companies and however you want to frame it haven't succeeded in developing their own technology and why, at least for the past several decades, like they've just accepted this dependence on the United States? And to be honest, that probably even goes back even further.

I remember reading about decades ago the concern that existed in France and other European countries with the reliance on, say, IBM computers and mainframes and stuff, right? Like even then there was this concern about being dependent on American technology, American computation, and what that might mean for these countries' ability to actually have control over the types of things that are happening within their borders.

And now we see these technologies are everywhere. It's completely reached like every facet of our lives, and it feels more than ever we have become dependent on American technology. So, so yeah, like why hasn't Europe succeeded in developing their own? Is it a lack of interest, or is there something that is kind of just fundamentally kind of broken about the model that they try to pursue in developing technology itself?

There are different factors at stay here, and to name just a few, a lot of people would say it's the availability of capital to invest, but it's also about how in the US innovation is planned more centrally, like the DARPA, like where a lot of public money has been poured into certain infrastructures, and then private actors just picked it up and turned it into commercial products.

This didn't happen in Europe. Part of this, I think, was then tried to resolve through regulation. If you believe in global markets, if you believe in free trade, would do the trick, right? And in Europe, over the last two decades, we've been developing digital regulation for platforms to at least slow down this accumulation of power with central actors.

And it's only now people seem to realize like, oh, some of these companies have actually become larger than states. There were some comments, for example, from the UK last November making very explicit they believe that politicians can no longer just regulate companies, but they need to do uh statecraft, like diplomacy with them.

So this is really taking it to a new level. If you believe you can still tax and regulate companies, there's less need to build something yourself. But now the companies are also signaling that they don't want to comply in the same way as they did before. And they can also then, for example, could also decide not to pay far.

Right, like enforceability of law has become a new topic in a way which wasn't relevant in the last few decades.

You see these Silicon Valley firms basically saying that they want to take advantage of the power of the Trump administration to push back on governments in Europe and other parts of the world that are trying to regulate what American tech companies are doing, right? To make sure that they're complying with the laws and the expectations in in different parts of the world that might differ from the expectations in the United States, for example.

And it's interesting you bring up the UK because I feel like, you know, we have really seen this almost capitulation in the United Kingdom to the demands of the tech industry, right? Passing these regulations that are favorable to the AI industry, getting rid of the head of the competition and markets authority there.

You know, more recently, as we talk, there has been discussion about watering down the digital services tax and making other changes that are designed to basically appease these major tech companies in the Trump administration because the UK is so desperate to get a trade deal with the United States, right?

So I guess I wonder then what you make of these narratives for why Europe has supposedly been unable to basically develop its own technological capacities, right? Because we certainly see that there is a growing push, as you were talking about there, to suggest that the big thing that is holding Europe back is the fact that it has these regulations against the tech companies, that it is too aggressive towards, say, mergers and acquisitions coming from the Mario Draghi report in particular that was published, I believe, the end of last year.

So what do you make of this kind of particular framing of the problem? And do you think that is accurate, or do you think that is people with particular political motivations trying to take advantage of a moment to get the kinds of policy developments that they have always kind of wanted?

I think there are two sides to this. So one is if Europe had tried to develop its own technological capacity, would that have looked any different from the technological developments we've seen in the US? I would say there was some short-sightedness in the way, for example, government procurement works, nobody ever got hired for firing IBM, nobody ever got fired for using Google Cloud or AWS.

People didn't, especially governments, didn't perceive this as a strategic area. I would say alleged question is what should they have done instead? And they could have poured more money into European companies, but would those products have looked significantly different? I doubt it, to be honest. And also now, I mean, what we see is that SAP, like the biggest European tech firm, its valuation is going up, military defense valuation is going up, and the products don't necessarily look so different.

So what Europe could have done, what it used to say in the past, is that they want a more open approach, like they want to build more open source, but then most of this just remained rhetoric. They just didn't put any money into this. In Germany, there's been I don't know how many years a debate about should the government use open source infrastructure instead.

Nobody seems to say no to this, but what happens is that people still buy the same proprietary systems as before, just saying yes, it would be nice to have open source, but then not do it. So that really doesn't help. Acknowledging the dependencies that exist really wasn't helpful for European policymakers and politicians to realize which situation they were in.

I want to talk about these bigger proposals for what digital sovereignty in Europe should look like right now. But since we touched on the topic of regulation, I just have a quick question on that, which is for years now, the European Union has been held up as the gold standard of tech regulation. It was actually willing to move forward with these regulations that other parts of the world were too slow at or, you know, were not willing to take seriously, and were treated very positively as a result of that, right?

By people in other parts of the world who really wanted to see similar developments elsewhere. I wonder in this moment where we are seeing this pressure on European tech regulation, we are already seeing active efforts to start rolling some aspects of that back. How people are reflecting on the impact that these regulations had and whether it was ultimately the right approach, right?

You know, whether Europe should have gone harder in the time that it had, or whether these regulations were just kind of trying to reduce the worst parts of what American tech was doing in Europe, but ultimately not doing this kind of fundamental change that feels like people are talking more and more about.

European policymakers are also prone to tech solutionism. So the European regulation had certain elements which, as I said, kind of were designed to curb some power, but none of this was designed to really change the business model of those big tech platforms. So this isn't a big surprise because people at the same time were still celebrating the success of those companies and admiring them.

Everybody was really concerned about not breaking them. So those regulations, as much political capital as it took to bring them in, were always on the soft side. They were helpful and they still are. So, for example, enforcing the Digital Markets Act properly is something that still makes sense, but we also shouldn't overestimate how much of a difference they make to those products.

For example, there are now compliance reports out just in the last couple of weeks on how well big tech companies have complied with this Digital Markets Act, for example, the interoperability requirements therein. And it really requires different sites to go very deep into by how much Apple, for example, can delay how it needs to respond to them.

So there are so many ways to comply in a malicious way that it's really, really hard to make anything of this work and open up those walled gardens we're seeing. And the whole question of how to deal with cloud hasn't even been addressed there in there.

I think that's a really good point, right? Like there's still positive things that came out of these regulations. And if they can really be seized in the way that even some things like the Digital Markets Act have been designed, there can be more good that can come out of it. Not to say that just forcing the American tech companies to do some other things is all that we need to do, but in forcing them to change the model and in restricting some of the things that they can do, it also opens the space to potentially think about how other potential platforms or digital services or digital technologies can be developed in a different way by first constraining what what the dominant players are able

to do or forcing them to act in particular ways, right? And so that kind of gets to this bigger discussion that I wanted to have with you, which is around these proposals for digital sovereignty, right? You know, as we've been talking about, Europe is recognizing and has recognized for some time that this reliance on American technology is ultimately an issue that needs to be addressed in some form of way.

But how that is going to be addressed has been up in the air. And a lot of that has been approached through regulation rather than really trying to effectively create European alternatives, though. Even then, we've seen more of that in the past number of years, I would say. So how is this argument being pushed in Europe at the moment?

And what are some of the big proposals that are being made for what a European tech industry or approach to digital technology should actually look like in a world where you increasingly can't rely on the United States and where Europe should take greater control of its own kind of technological destiny?

Maybe let me add to this. I'm undecided on the question of whether Europe should do this or whether it's generally the big dependence on a few powerful players that's the problem. Then building kind of European counterparts might not change as much as we would like to see.

I completely agree with you, right? The last thing that we should want to see, and you know, especially both of us and the perspective that we have on this, and that I think many of the listeners of this show would have as well, is that we don't just want to see like a European Amazon and a European Facebook spring up and do all the same problematic things that we see these American companies do.

Like that is not the move forward that we ultimately want to see just to create European versions of like some of the worst companies on the planet, companies that we have a lot of issues with. But yeah, please talk a bit about some of these proposals and how they are really framing this problem and what they see as the correct response to it.

So one of the most prominent proposals so far, I would say, is the Eurostack, which has been shaped by different people and organizations. So it's not really a uniform proposal and it contains a lot of different aspects. But the one point that has been resonating most, I would say, is to buy European, basically to get European governments mainly to start buying from European companies along the stack.

There is also some discussion about what are the layers we should be focusing on? Are we talking about applications, infrastructure, what is the role of chips and so on? But the general push is to buy European. European governments have a lot of purchasing power, and where they put their money really matters.

If we want to reduce the dependence on big tech companies, they must find a way to really end those contracts. The Eurostack, I would say, also shares a lot of emphasis on growth and innovation, which I fear can be easily captured by others who are still subordinated to big tech but don't pursue a substantially different approach.

So, like Deutsche Telekom, SAP, Orange, those big players, they all go, Yes, yes, buy European, please. And there was a big letter published earlier this week signed by over a hundred companies, and everybody was like, Wow, those companies want governments to buy European. I mean, who could have expected that, right?

What European companies want European governments to spend all their money on European companies? What a surprise.

Where we already see this happening, and I need to make this link here, is really in the military sector. You can tell whether people are serious about what they say if you look at where they put their money. And they have been putting more money into defense companies, and there is a significant amount of overlap between defense, cybersecurity, and so on.

And so also EU tech firms, they very much welcome the sovereignty paradigm shift. And they also think that AI and quantum are like great elements of a defense strategy. This is coming together in a way which really finds its home, also or can find its home in within the Eurostack proposal, because there's nothing in it that prevents that from happening.

That makes a lot of sense though, like as you describe that, because I feel like in the United States we see as well, a lot of these folks from Silicon Valley, you know, in the past presented themselves as anti-state or having some reservations about working with the state, even though the companies were always always had a relationship with government and always kind of benefited from that relationship, right?

But in the past year or or in the past few years, we have seen this growing focus on the arms side of the tech industry and meaning like these companies that we typically associate with Silicon Valley when we talk about tech, because tech can mean many different things, but this kind of push to sell more AI to the military, right?

Or to sell more, you know, means of kind of crunching all this data and trying to figure out or trying to help the military figure out, you know, what is useful in all this data, or even newer companies like Andrew, for example, that are actively developing like military hardware that is going to be sold there, like this real pivot away from this notion of like platforms and software toward something that is much more physical.

So I guess it's not a surprise then to see that one of the big opportunities, especially if Europe is talking about kind of re-arming or spending a lot more on military, is for these tech companies and European tech companies in particular, to say we're totally on board with this military buildup. We will develop these military technologies, and this is going to be a key part of how we maintain a kind of sovereignty into this new kind of geopolitical era.

I think we probably both agree that tech solutionism is harmful, but I think what this means in this military context is something that some people and certainly I still have to grapple with because more efficient, more automated killing systems really takes this to a different dimension. One of the big winners of this in Europe is Helsing, which, according to the Financial Times, is developing AI for use on the battlefield.

And they raised 450 million euros, for example, last year. So this will be very difficult to somehow govern in a democratic way. Well, but the public discourse is saying, wow, we have startups, we have successful companies, let's do that. There's dual use of the militaries, so and finally we have investment.

So we get growth, innovation, all these buzzwords go hand in hand with this military agenda.

Yeah, it's so concerning, and I'm really happy that you brought up that point of it, right? So that we understand the way that these discussions are being very easily and very quickly seized by these people who are pushing for this expansion in military buildup, in selling more arms, in making sure that there are even more deadly forms of technology being deployed on the world that make it much easier to kill even more people.

Something that we've already seen, of course, in in Gaza, with the way that Israel has been using uh, you know, kind of AI targeting systems to justify much greater damage by saying that, you know, oh, the computer is telling us where to where to find these people, right? That we need to attack, regardless of whether that is accurate.

It doesn't matter. The computer has identified it. But anyway, you talked about the broader Eurostack proposal there. One of the things that you identified, I think, is really key, right, in in having these discussions. And that is that there's still this push for growth, right? For profits, for these underlying economic indicators that we consider to be like kind of the gospel for how we run our societies, right?

You know, if we're not having a certain amount of economic growth, if the companies aren't making adequate profits, then the, you know, the whole model is broken and we're doing it all wrong. And it does feel like that is the heart of the problem here, right? European governments, governments in Canada and other parts of the world were happy to embrace American technology because they hoped that this was going to bring about prosperity and growth and these other kind of particular benefits to their societies.

And now, as they increasingly try to pivot to do something more domestically, again, the focus is okay, how do we build the next unicorn, right? The next company that's going to be worth a billion dollars and when it goes public on the stock market or something, right? How do we build these companies that are going to make a lot of money, that are going to be able to sell their products internationally?

And inherently, that forces them to then operate on a very similar model as Silicon Valley and having these same problems. So, how do you see that reflected in these proposals? And do you see any kind of pushback to this notion at all? Or is this kind of idea within these policy circles very much that, like, yeah, we need European technology, but European technology kind of on this model because we can't possibly question this deeper economic drive that is pushing us in this direction?

So, again, I would distinguish between rhetoric and then operationalizing this in a way that can actually lead to action. So there is a lot of talk about European values, but at the same time, nobody's talking really about climate anymore. Nobody's talking about inequality right now, at least not in a way that would actually change how tax sovereignty is supposed to be constructed.

Unfortunately, yeah, I think it's a it's a fairly short answer that it's not on top of people's minds because there is so much fear of other things and those bigger concerns of climate change, global inequality, the mere fact that those technologies that have been built have contributed so much to interdependencies and to inequality, yeah, is just an afterthought because right now it feels like people just need to act in whatever way.

There's this feeling of there's no time to now actually think about values that would look different. Even though, again, there is mention also of open source, but some of that discussion is taking place outside of the Eurostack debate. Well, as I hinted at earlier, in the past, there isn't a great track record of making sure action follows up on the rhetoric.

In this proposal for like a Eurostack, which is this idea that there is this kind of stack of technologies that is necessary for a modern society when you go from everything from chips to platforms to the cables and data centers and all the things in between, right? That say Europe or any modern society would need to build out.

What is the role of the state seen there? Is it just as kind of a player that tries to catalyze particular investments, or is there any kind of accepting that the state could actually move in and play a role in, say, building a public cloud or doing something that takes some of these things out of the market in the way that we so often see in the digital technology sector, that so much needs to be just sacrificed and given over to the private sector?

The Eurostack proposal isn't super clear on that. Uh it's really mainly state government procurement, which is identified as a level there. The state isn't a key actor. There's no space for democratic empowerment within that. The proposal that you have written with Cecilia Irike and others, uh, if I may bring that in, which focuses really on ecological internationalism and democratic empowerment, is quite a different program here, which has certain elements in common with the Eurostack and also has a different conception of the state.

The Eurostack, in most part, is rather skeptical of the state becoming too important. It's mostly supposed to de-risk investment, which means costs can be taken by the public and to make sure that it's profitable for companies to invest.

It's not a surprise, but it is frustrating to see it, right? That that it's kind of like, okay, there is this opportunity in this moment to think about doing technology in a very different way because the Trump administration and the position of the United States and the power of these billionaires in Silicon Valley has forced not just governments but the wider public, whether it is in Canada or Europe or many other parts of the world, to say we should really be doing something different.

To see that kind of energy or that recognition just seized on to try to create some new market or something is kind of profoundly disappointing when there's also an alternative to think about something broadly. And I wonder you have obviously seen how these debates are playing out in Europe much more closely than I have.

Do you see much of a push for a different way of thinking about this? Do you think that there are entry points to really start to try to frame things in even a slightly different manner on some of these issues? Or does it feel like this market-oriented, military-oriented approach has really dominated to an overwhelming degree?

I think right now this approach is very dominant. At the same time, keeping other approaches alive is important. There are also opportunities, some of which might need to happen from the bottom up. So you have like local communities, for example, trying to go open source and have a different approach to implementing technology.

How to scale that? That's really the challenge. Because it's not really profitable most of the time, right? So I wouldn't say it's so surprising the way this has turned, because they are still in competition with those US companies. So unless you get a very strong commitment to really apply other principles, and again, I I'm very skeptical about the principle being European.

I think it's more what actually makes that technology different? How is it developed? How do we ensure more democratic governance? That should be one of the key questions. Establishing those principles and having political commitment to follow through, that could make a difference. But otherwise, if you need to compete on profitability with big tech platforms, that makes it very hard to implement something different.

I completely agree, right? It's the fundamental issue there that needs to be addressed and that so many people don't seem to want to actually talk about it, grapple with, right? The fact that if we are going to accept that we need to maximize profitability, that's naturally going to lead us in a certain direction, which is probably not the one that we would actually want to go with if we want to make sure that technology is being developed in the public interest, you know, to think about how it's going to best serve, you know, the broader public and not just create profits for a small number of American or European or whatever else corporations, right?

You know, you mentioned the other proposal that I worked on with Cecilia Recap and others called Reclaiming Digital Sovereignty. I think that was part of the goal of that paper as well, right? And of that intervention was to say we know that these other proposals are coming and some are already being discussed.

And so how do we try to make sure that there's at least, you know, a different perspective that is out there that is being represented, that at least some people are pushing for, that is not just around military buildup and kind of national economic development, but is about how do we think about actually creating a broader alliance where we make sure that these technologies are beneficial to a wide swath of the global public, not just about making profits or making national champions in a small number of countries, but is actually thinking about technology for the better, what technology could actually look like in a world that is not so focused on profit and how.

Those things could be designed in a in a very different way. And obviously there's so much that I could say about that. I wonder if you were thinking about how this approach might be done in a better way, in a way that serves the public much more than just serving these major European corporations in the case of Europe, as we're talking about.

How do you think that would be done differently? Obviously, you were talking about local solutions, but do you actually see any movement in that direction? Or is it just so hard to try to achieve in this moment because of the overwhelming push toward a certain direction and a certain way of doing things?

To be frank, I think a lot of energy right now is put into making sure things don't become as bad as they are in the US. So we also see Doge style conversations happening. We see this, I mean, the military turn just to slow that down, I think, is valuable. And also thinking more about authoritarianism as an issue rather than framing everything as a geopolitical race.

So understanding in the US, for example, many people are fleeing right now from an authoritarian government, and some people here are framing this as an opportunity for Europe, which I think is cynical. So just exposing these dynamics and making people aware of that, I think is valuable in its own right.

And then thinking about how we can actually construct something that is more valuable for the people, that is probably the next step, or is something we need to try to insert into those ongoing conversations. There's no point in having a completely separate conversation, but kind of reducing certain tendencies within this Eurostack discussion.

For example, emphasizing the value of even though open source on its own won't get you that far because it can also be extract, its value is all extracted by big tech companies. But like having those small elements is the best I feel we can do in practice right now. And your proposal that you develop.

Refining that at the same time, what I find really important is this point about research, having a research agenda, so having kind of a long-term commitment towards technology that works on a different basis, is more inclusive, can be governed in a democratic way. I think that's very important. And that's something that Europe shouldn't do on its own.

There, we need more voices at the table that can happen in parallel. But right now, the policy discussions are really preventing worse things from happening, is what I consider my personal objective.

Yeah, that's completely fair. And I think that's a good objective to have, right? Aline, it was really great to talk to you to understand much more about what is happening in Europe right now, how these developments are progressing. And it's certainly something that I'll be following, that I'm sure many of the listeners will be interested in following.

So maybe we'll have to have you on back on again in in the future to dig into how these things are continuing to move. But thank you so much for taking the time. I really appreciate it.

Thank you, Paris.

Now and previously at Wikimedia Germany. Tech Won's Save Us is made in partnership with the Nation magazine and it's hosted by me, Paris Marks. Production is by Eric Wickham. Tech Won's Save Us or Lies in the support of listeners like you to keep providing critical perspectives on the tech industry. You can join hundreds of other supporters by going to patreon.com slash tech won't save us and making a pledge of your own.

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