Fear of a Nuclear January 6th

0:07 Welcome back to It Could Happen Here, a show about things falling apart. I'm Robert Evans. We all know what happened at the U.S. Capitol on January 6th, 2021. Those events were so consequential and infamous that I fear people have forgotten how they felt about the possibility of an attack on the Capitol by a mob of citizens on January 5th. That's not something I can forget, as I spent my first days of January that year digging through thousands of comments on social media and MAGA-focused message boards.

0:37 I came away from my research convinced an attack on the Capitol was possible, and I tried to warn people. I was not the only researcher who wrote about the possibility of an attack on the Capitol before January 6th. None of our warnings were heeded, in part because the authorities, like most people, considered the odds of a mob successfully occupying the Capitol to be right around 0%. The United States is the most powerful nation in history, the argument went, and the Capitol building and nearby government facilities are some of the most hardened targets on Earth. There's no way a mob of mostly unarmed protesters could just storm them like the Winter Palace and put lawmakers' lives at risk.

1:15 Your fears are a fantasy. You're just trying to scare people. Shut up. Well, we were correct about January 6th, and over the last few years, I've begun to worry about something new. The name I've given this fear is Nuclear January 6th. Now, I'm not talking about an all-out nuclear war here, and I'm certainly not talking about a nuclear strike on the U.S. Capitol, although that's one possible way this could occur. You're all readily familiar with the possibility and consequences of Atomic Holocaust, and I'm not using that term for the possibility of a terrorist organization or their non-state actor acquiring a nuke or dirty bomb, which remains possible, but let's say unlikely. A nuclear January 6th would be

1:56 a lot like its namesake, a catastrophic event that would have seemed impossible, even laughably so, before it occurred and involves the use of a nuclear weapon. A nuclear January 6th, then, would be a fuck-up, either a disastrous nuclear error caused by incompetence or a limited nuclear deployment inspired by incompetence.

2:17 Either way, the scenario I'm envisioning doesn't mean the end of the world, It means one or at most a small number of warheads are detonated for a very stupid reason, and we're all left to move forward in a world that is now permanently less safe. In 1989, American political scientist Robert Jervis published a book titled The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon. Looking out at the international situation at the tail end of the Cold War, Jervis argued that war between nuclear powers was now unthinkable. Within the context of that conflict, he was correct. Both the U.S. and the USSR, despite their separate battalions of war hawks and substantial doses of paranoia,

2:58 avoided stepping over the nuclear brink. The men who ran both nations clearly considered nuclear war unthinkable. In the decades since the Cold War's end, the nations of the world have continued to avoid nuking us all into Cormac McCarthy's The Road. But there is an unfortunate amount of evidence that some of the people in charge of the great powers of our time no longer find deploying a nuke to be unthinkable, even against other nuclear powers. The clearest example of this comes from the Russian Federation and its activities in Ukraine. Back in January, The Bell, an independent Russian news site, reported on building support in the Kremlin for the battlefield use of a tactical nuclear weapon. This

3:38 was thought to most likely occur over Crimea. A 2022 U.S. Intel assessment independently estimated 50% odds that Putin would order a nuclear strike if the defenses around Crimea began to fail. Russian nuclear doctrine today supports the use of atomic weapons against an existential threat. And as Kieran Monks writes in a piece for iNews, Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Rybakov said this morning this meant encroachments on Russia or its territorial integrity by aggressors, including those who may possess such weapons, could prompt us to use these weapons in the worst-case scenario.

4:13 The loss of Crimea, which Putin calls an inseparable part of Russia, could technically reach that threshold, said Dr. Pavel Podvig, a senior researcher and specialist on Russia's nuclear forces at the UN Institute for Disarmament Research. Now, my understanding of the situation in Ukraine is that Crimea is not under imminent danger of being retaken by Ukrainian forces, somewhat unfortunately. However, the vagueness of Russia's nuclear line being an existential threat means that they might well decide one day that diesel refining facilities count, given the centrality of oil exports to their economy. Sergei Karaganov, head of a defense industry think tank in Moscow and former advisor to Putin, is among

4:52 Russia's largest nuclear hawks. He has recently argued for limited nuclear strikes on Ukraine's European allies. I bring this up not because that's a scenario I'm discussing today. If Russia nuked a NATO country, that would be a de facto strike on a nuclear power and would likely end up being much worse than my nuclear January 6th theory. I bring this up because comments like this from Russia have contributed to an unfortunate trend in U.S. defense circles. Serious discussion about the need for expanded low-yield tactical nuclear options.

5:21 And folks, remember, when we're saying low-yield nuclear weapons, we're still often talking about stuff at least on par with the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs, if not still considerably more powerful. Those count as low-yield weapons today. For most of our lifetimes, The U.S. has focused its nuclear research and buildup on what we might call big civilization-ending doomsday nukes. I'm using a little hyperbole there, but not much. Most of our standing nuclear weapons are strategic in nature. That means they're very big, and they're meant to deter an enemy from launching a full-scale nuclear attack on us. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists estimates that about 94% of all actively deployed U.S.

6:00 warheads are long-range strategic weapons. As Gabriel Honrada noted in an article for Asia Times, this makes tactical nukes a, quote, small, specialized component of overall U.S. nuclear posture. You and I might consider that a good thing because any nuke small enough to use safely is likelier to get used. However, when defense planners hear, The U.S. has very few tactical nukes, alongside news articles about Russia threatening to use small tactical nukes, a funny thing happens. They begin to worry about a gap between our capability and that of an adversary. Fears of that gap have been further exacerbated by recent significant modernization of China's nuclear arsenal. In the last few years, the Chinese military has massively increased the quality of their

6:43 nuclear weapons and the related equipment, the delivery devices and such. I'm not going to go into a nerdy, fear-mongery deep dive about the exact capabilities of these new tools. That doesn't really matter today. What does matter is that in August of 2026, U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby initiated a policy review of the nation's nuclear posture.

7:05 The stated goal of this review is, per coverage by Breaking Defense, quote, focused on providing more options for the White House. Undersecretary Colby expressed the need for what he called rational nuclear options to deal with the changing threats from China and Russia. And, as Honrada wrote in his article, the policy review comes amid long-standing U.S. DoD concerns over foreign deployments in low-yield warheads, which risk leaving the U.S.

7:29 without proportional non-strategic responses. An expansion in the number of, and potentially the in-theater deployment of, low-yield nuclear weapons does not guarantee their use. low-yield nukes have been deployed to hot zones or potential hot zones before, albeit decades ago during the height of the Cold War. But I have trouble looking at this current administration in the U.S. and so much of the bombastic, kill-obsessed rhetoric that comes out of the Department of War these days, and believing that the terms low-yield and tactical won't be interpreted as safe to use. In fact, there's a real chance that just by accepting the need for more of these weapons and deploying some near-conflict regions, we'll start a countdown whereby some

8:10 of our current defense thinkers convince themselves there's a ticking clock, and they need to find a target for a low-yield nuclear strike to prove we've got the guts to use this thing. If that sounds far-fetched, I want you to think back to April of 2017, when the U.S. conducted an airstrike in Afghanistan using the largest non-nuclear weapon we've got, the MOAB. There were some logical reasons for such a strike.

8:32 ISIS fighters were using a tunnel network, and the MOAB is meant to penetrate and take out such underground targets. That said, there's no evidence this facility or the 36-ish ISIS fighters killed in the blast represented a threat to U.S. interests in the region necessitating such a dramatic response. Many pundits suspected the real reason we dropped this big bomb had more to do with Trump's campaign promise to bomb the shit out of ISIS. Faisal Pervez, an analyst for the military intelligence forum Stratfor, told Vice his suspicions. We drop a bomb that weighs 21,000 pounds. That's so big.

9:06 I think a part of it, or some part of it, is the messaging and the symbolic significance that the U.S. is sending out to countries such as Russia, that we are the premier military in the world. We are the biggest power. We have the tools and weapons to show you that this is the case. Well, the same man who dropped that bomb is back in power now. We are fighting a losing war with Iran that has endangered his power. Back in April of 2026, President Trump threatened Iran by saying, a whole civilization will die tonight if the Strait of Hormuz was not reopened. More recently, he's mused that Iran might take out Los Angeles or San Diego with a nuclear weapon someday, which he viewed as a small price to pay for the permission that would

9:44 give the U.S. to annihilate Iran in return. We'll keep talking about this, but first, here's some ads. We're back. If more low-yield nuclear weapons are built and deployed, they will become, in startlingly short time, just another option on the menu for military planners. We might expect decade-standing traditions against using such weapons to count for something, But as you're aware, Pete Hegseth has purged a huge number of veteran leaders from the Department of Defense. Similar brain drains have occurred across all of our primary national security institutions.

10:29 There are fewer cooler heads to prevail. Hegseth has also made lethality and kill count into our military's primary measure of operational success. More to my point, today the entire Trump administration runs on social media. Truth Social, Twitter, and TikTok aren't just organs the regime uses to disseminate propaganda.

10:47 They are where Donald Trump and his advisors go for information and to take the pulse of the nation. Let's consider one possible chain of events. Some months from now, Trump orders a tactical nuke deployed with our forces attacking Iran. The plan isn't to use it, but to threaten the enemy and generate a groundswell of rage among Trump's domestic enemies, which is always something he thinks about. Soon after the weapon arrives, Iranian forces score a major hit. Maybe one of their ballistic missile strikes and damages a naval vessel killing soldiers. Maybe they hit a base and cause an unprecedented loss of lives and materiel. Such a strike is not impossible. It could happen tomorrow, and it would not

11:24 need to debilitate or cripple our military forces long term to provoke Donald Trump into a nuclear response. All it would need to do is embarrass him. As his footage spreads, a fire raging atop an aircraft carrier or a burning frigate listing at sea or wounded and dying U.S. soldiers near a base, Trump's followers begin howling for blood on social media. One cry sounds out louder than all the others.

11:49 Nuke the bastards. Trump might. Such a strike would be unlikely to cause an immediate apocalyptic cascade into nuclear war. There would be international outrage, but not outright retaliation. Even so, in a stroke, Trump would have dissolved any remaining stigma against the use of nuclear weapons in war. This would make Russia much likelier to use a tactical nuke in Ukraine.

12:12 It might change Chinese calculations, RE Taiwan, but what it would inarguably do is make nuclear weapons a normal, conceivable, usable tool of conventional war. I don't know how long it would take the breaking of that taboo to generate a larger nuclear war, But I believe after this point, such a future would become almost inevitable. It is still quite possible, even likelier, that Russia would be the first nation-state to break the taboo and use a tactical nuke for the reasons I've just outlined. This might lead to a similar outcome worldwide, although I'm less certain of that.

12:46 Russia is considered an international pariah to many in ways that the United States still isn't quite. That said, I have no doubt that the ultimate chain of events leading to such a deployment would be just as stupid as they would be in the United States. China feels less likely to be the direct cause of such a deployment.

13:03 Their nuclear policy originated from Mao Zedong. He did not love nuclear weapons, calling them a paper tiger and talking shit on the US and the USSR for building so many of the damn things. When China became a nuclear state in 1964, Mao stated the only use for this thing, his term for the bomb, was to deter other nuclear-armed countries.

13:24 As a result, China has always had an official no-first-use policy with their nuclear arsenal. This differs from the U.S. and Russia, who operate by launch on warn. In other words, if we think you're going to nuke us, we will nuke you. China's official policy is minimum deterrence. That's generally translated to mean we keep our arsenal at the minimum level necessary to deter our adversaries. However, in an article on the evolution of China's nuclear posture, the website DEFCON Warning System notes, This declaratory posture also embodies China's strategic ambiguity.

13:57 For one, minimum deterrence remains undefined. Chinese officials have never quantified what a minimum nuclear capability means in practice. Is it a few dozen warheads able to strike back? A few hundred? As China's arsenal grows, the goalposts appear to shift. Similarly, what constitutes an arms race is left vague. Beijing's current buildup, by far its largest and fastest ever, ostensibly does not violate its pledge to avoid arms racing, at least in its own view. Crucially, China's nuclear doctrine has begun to stress achieving strategic counterbalance with other powers. Though not officially defined, this phrase suggests Beijing sees its nuclear forces as vital to shaping the global power equilibrium. It implies a more

14:35 assertive role for nukes, not merely to deter an attack on China, but to offset the overall military might of rivals, particularly the United States. This nuanced shift in language contributes to uncertainty. Does counterbalance mean China seeks nuclear parity with the U.S. or simply a survivable second strike? The lack of clarity keeps observers guessing. Now, I don't bring any of this up with the interest of fear-mongering over China, but because the questions and ambiguities outlined in that segment are a real cause for concern to the defense analysts who study China, not just for the U.S. government, but over in New Delhi. The Indian state is locked in a continuous low-level border conflict with China, alongside their border

15:15 conflict with Pakistan, also a nuclear-armed state. Both China and India have been extremely careful to avoid bringing nuclear threats to the table. But that only underlines how much leaders in both nations fear the possibility. And over on their border with Pakistan, nuclear threats have come up recently. 2025 saw a large skirmish between India and Pakistan that included cross-border aerial raids. After several days of this, Pakistan's foreign secretary issued a statement on May 28th. We will not hesitate to use any weapon in our arsenal to defend our territorial integrity. This was interpreted as a nuclear threat and caused a massive international ruckus, which prompted a spokesman for Pakistan's government to clarify that that was not the intent.

15:59 We all lucked out that the May 2025 conflict did not occur at the same time as another uptick in hostility between Beijing and New Delhi, but it's easy to imagine something like that might occur. In the event of such a conflict, Pakistan would rely heavily on their naval forces, armed with nuclear weapons, to complete the third leg of their nuclear triad. Having a nuclear triad, which means having separate land, sea, and air-based weapon systems that can deploy nuclear weapons, is considered the gold standard for nuclear deterrence.

16:30 Most nations that have one fulfill the third leg of the triad with nuclear-armed attack submarines. The most advanced of these are, inarguably, the deadliest weapon systems ever devised by man. Pakistan is generally considered to be the nuclear power with the least reliable protections for their arsenal. These have long inspired fear that Pakistan might lose control of a weapon or that rogue elements of their security services might give one to a terrorist group. That's not my concern here.

16:56 One of my sources for these episodes was an article in the Defense and Security Analysis Journal. Its authors point out that in recent years, Pakistan has done a decent job of sealing some of the former security holes in their nuclear weapons systems. However, as one researcher noted in 2014, Parts of Pakistan's nuclear management system, like its command element, have been reasonably transparent. Other parts, like the physical security and surety human reliability elements, have been at best translucent.

17:22 In many areas, there are only bald assertions that programs and methods have been put into place, with very few details provided. One of the parts of their management system we know least about is the rules under which shipboard nuclear weapons operate. In theory, any nuclear weapons used by Pakistani forces would have to be authorized by a special 10-man committee. It's believed, but not known, that some systems require both a civilian and military key to be provided in order for the weapons to become operable. This is because Pakistan's military has a long history of outright running the shop. Today, civilian leadership is meant to have much more oversight. One example of this is the fact that

18:01 all air and land-based nuclear weapons in Pakistan are stored separate from their delivery systems. This makes them harder to steal and makes it more complex for, say, rogue military leaders to get a hold of a piece of the arsenal. But we already know that Pakistan's naval nukes do not work exactly the same way. Per that journal article, quote, Little information is available for the naval leg of Pakistan's deterrent, currently based on the Babur III submarine-launched cruise missile. First test-fired in 2017 and described by Pakistan's Inter-Services Public Relations as a second-strike capability because of its naval requirements, the Babur III is assumed to be pre-mated and contained within

18:38 a vertical launch system or similar canisterized device. Procedures meant to inhibit the use of nuclear weapons outside authorized uses are called negative controls. We do not know what negative controls Pakistan has for their naval weapons. it is entirely possible the military remains in total control here and justifies that as necessary for guaranteeing their ability to launch retaliatory strikes against India. I want you to think right now about a fun new development in technology that we've all witnessed, the growth of generative AI tools that can convincingly mimic both human posters on social media and create believable fake videos, including fake news videos. These and similar tools make it

19:20 possible to flood any region with targeted disinformation and make it seem legitimate, at least for a short span of time. Earlier this year, in March of 2026, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists published a theoretical article by Herbert Lin. He's a Stanford fellow and expert on cyber warfare operations who in 2016 worked for the Obama administration. Back in the 1980s, he was a staff scientist for the House Armed Services Committee, so he's a guy with some knowledge of this area. The article he put together envisioned several scenarios in which AI tools might help cause or exacerbate a nuclear conflict. None of his scenarios involved anything like Skynet.

19:58 The dangers he foresees from AI come not from its intelligence so much as its ability to automate the production of targeted bullshit and influence the decisions of political leaders. And speaking of targeted bullshit, Here's some ads. We're back. And I was talking about an article for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists written by Herbert Lin. One of his scenarios envisioned a blockade of Taiwan. in which the Chinese military deployed an army of AI chatbots to lie about military maneuvers in order to create the impression of high military readiness to deter U.S. intervention. I don't consider this specific scenario very likely, but I do think he's onto something with passages like this. The accounts adopt personas

20:50 of professionals or students isolated by the crisis and connect with foreigners through the full suite of channels described above. These spaces attract not only their regular users, but also journalists, analysts, and even mid-level Pentagon staffers looking for unfiltered intelligence. In one instance, a bot mimicking a 28-year-old engineer named Li Wei claims, I saw convoys with TELs heading east, DF-26s probably, referring to mobile transporter erector launchers used to launch ballistic missiles and land-based dual-capable DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Before adding, sirens everywhere, evacuations starting. Then screenshots start flooding the social media platform X, formerly known as Twitter, amplified by coordinated

21:28 sock puppets. The bots adapt seamlessly to queries, cross-referencing real-time U.S. open-source chatter for added plausibility. A user of Tinder, a dating app in Washington, D.C., matched with Wang Mei, a fabricated nurse in Ximeng. who relays her alleged eyewitness panic about explosions near the port and prepping of hypersonic weapons, which aligns with the partial satellite imagery glitches caused by Chinese jamming and begins to see doubt in U.S. intelligence assessments.

21:54 State media subtly echoes these stories, framing them as grassroots outrage at U.S. provocation. In the United States, some of this material migrates into expert discourse. Open source intelligence analysts, journalists, and think tank experts incorporate screenshots and chat logs into maps, timelines, and situation reports. and present them on cable news and in policy briefs as independent confirmations of missile movements. Congressional staffers and allied governments cite these products in their own assessments, generating a feedback loop in which fabricated chats appear as triangulated, multi-source evidence. I think the only weakness of Lin's article is his focus on scenarios that lead to mass nuclear exchange,

22:31 and in his insistence on considering nation-states as the only relevant actors in most of these escalation cycles. But the basic process he outlined there, a bad actor flooding regional social media with disinformation designed to look like OSINT that suggests an imminent attack, that's entirely possible, and you wouldn't need a nation-state level actor to pull it off. Let's say you have a well-funded non-state group of ideological hardliners.

22:57 Let's imagine them as partisans of India or Pakistan, right? You could also imagine they're just trolls, eager to add confusion for the lulz. Or more insidiously... you could imagine them as motivated to pull off a massive score gambling on world events by betting on a limited nuclear attack and then making one happen. Returning to our hypothetical border conflict between India and Pakistan, let's imagine another outbreak of actual shooting like May of 2025. Imagine whichever of those hypothetical non-state groups you like to pick floods the region with reports of Indian nuclear forces mobilizing or even weapons inbound.

23:34 This would occur alongside the already nightmarish disruption of communication and command and control that will occur during such times of conflict. Is it so crazy to imagine that one of those Pakistani ships chooses to fire its payload? There's a very good reason why most nuclear-armed nations do not give military leaders direct control over how and when to fire these weapons. We don't know how Pakistan governs the use of their naval nukes, not really, and that means we cannot discount such a possibility. The kind of decisions made in nuclear war planning tend to come with a timer of less than a half hour. New weapon systems like hypersonic missiles have shortened that even further. This means

24:12 any decision about when to deploy nuclear weapons is likely going to be made on a very short time frame by frightened people. Another equally terrifying vision of that scenario could lead China, Pakistan, and India to each conclude, based on a mix of real movements by neighboring forces and a flood of AI disinformation, to activate and position their nuclear arsenals just in case. Once you have nuclear weapons assembled, deployed, and aimed, the odds rise exponentially that something might go wrong, even if no one chooses to fire them. And the same sort of concerted digital disinformation attack, executed by a state or non-state actor, could happen today, during literally any tense international situation with a potential for nuclear escalation. As

24:57 I said, my interest here is not in an apocalypse narrative, but in the possibility of a limited nuclear fuck-up. Let me propose another that might occur in this situation. In the US, all nuclear weapons are built to be what's called one-point safe. This means the weapon has a probability of less than one in a million of causing a nuclear detonation if the weapon explodes unintentionally. We have had nuclear weapons destroyed in plane crashes. and so far they have never detonated in a proper nuclear explosion on accident because they're one point safe. Other nations do not necessarily abide by the same safety rules in their nuclear weapons, and we simply do not know if Pakistan's nukes are safe in the same way. Imagine, then, as the border

25:42 conflict heats up, Pakistan's military assembles their arsenal and begins flying it in theater. A plane crashes or gets shot down, and the weapon inside detonates in a proper nuclear fireball. Every one of my nuclear fuck-up scenarios relies on terrible decision-making. Clear-thinking civilian and military leaders do not take the kind of risks that would lead to a nuclear January 6th. Alas, clear-thinking civilian and military leaders are thin on the ground these days, especially where I live. As I noted earlier, the decision-makers in any of these situations, regardless of national identity, might have only minutes to make their decisions. They'll be frightened and probably sleep-deprived. And what do frightened, sleep-deprived people

26:24 turn to these days when they need to get work done? That's right, AI. In a CNN article from earlier this year, Katie Lillis and Zachary Cohen write, Across the U.S. military and the intelligence community, officials are pushing to weave AI into nearly every facet of their work, from analyzing the huge volumes of raw intelligence the U.S. collects and selecting targets for strikes, to more mundane applications like managing budgeting, logistics, and supply chains. Just a few months ago, Back in the spring of 2026, one member of the intel community, an analyst, asked one of these chatbots to analyze intelligence around a Chinese vessel sailing to the Middle East. The bot was likely an internal tool, but as one senior U.S.

27:02 official told CNN, the internal tools are mostly just copies of the commercial stuff wearing lipstick. Said bot did what bots do best. It mixed a bunch of different sources together to create a product for its user. This analysis, based on a mix of OSINT and secret intel, concluded that the Chinese ship was carrying components used in the production of nuclear weaponry. The analyst asked his AI tool to take its finding and produce an intelligence report, which was sent up the chain of command. Since the vessel was headed in the general direction of Iran, and since China does sell conventional weapons to Iran, this sparked a panic.

27:36 Per that CNN article, the U.S. military swung into action with plans to intercept the vessel, according to four sources familiar with the episode. According to two of the sources, armed members of the U.S. military were preparing to board the ship. Military planes were in the air, one of these sources and another source familiar with the incident said.

27:52 There was only one issue. The AI chatbot that Analyst used had hallucinated. Every piece of that report was wrong. China was not sending nuclear weapons equipment to Iran or anywhere else because of fucking course they weren't. But we came calamitously close to attacking a Chinese ship with military force due to that hallucination. In January, Pete Hegseth gave a speech outlining our Department of Defense's new AI strategy.

28:17 He insisted, We will unleash experimentation, eliminate bureaucratic barriers, focus our investments, and demonstrate the execution approach needed to ensure we lead in military AI. All that says to me is that these tools will only become more critical to the production of intelligence products than ever before, and we know they'll continue to hallucinate too. This change isn't just happening in the United States. It's occurring in governments and militaries all across the world. and it's happening at the same time as some nuclear-armed nations seek to expand their low-yield stockpiles. Simultaneously, the U.S. war against Iran and the ongoing war in Ukraine have made it clear to every nation-state actor that the only real guarantee of national sovereignty

28:55 is a nuclear arsenal. More nations will work to acquire nukes in the near future. This means more nuclear weapons and more conflicts where they might get used, alongside an even wider proliferation of tools like the ones I just described. I'm not trying to be apocalyptic here because, again, that's not really the immediate worry. The worry is that a mix of increasing acceptance that it's okay to use small nukes and increasing reliance on these AI tools alongside the conflicts that we have always had between nations will lead to a situation in which a very limited nuclear fuck-up not only is disastrous to people on the ground or wherever it occurs, but changes the very nature and all of the decision-making calculus in the world that.

29:36 We live in.

29:37 I hope it doesn't happen, but What I'm thinking about these days. That's everything for today. We'll be back tomorrow.

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30:04 Thanks for listening.