The False Promise of Tactical Nuclear Weapons

There is considerable evidence that the US is interested in “expanding its options” for using its nuclear arsenal. In particular, it appears that the Pentagon would like to increase its reliance on tactical nuclear weapons for both deterrence and warfighting should deterrence fail.

I will argue that fighting a war with tactical nuclear weapons is unlikely to produce a meaningful military victory and is likely to have catastrophic consequences. In fact, the US and NATO embraced this very option in the 1950s in the context of a war in Europe, only to realize that they had to find a different way to deter the Soviet Union and fight it should deterrence break down. The same basic logic that applied then still applies today. Simply put, tactical nuclear weapons are not war-winning weapons.

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CHAPTERS

Introduction
Why tactical nuclear weapons, why now
From massive retaliation to flexible options
The real driver: weakened conventional forces
Ukraine, Iran, and depleted munitions
Balancing conventional and nuclear deterrence
The appeal of tactical nukes on the battlefield
Why that thinking is misguided
Defending Europe in the 1950s
NATO's nuclear answer — and why the US never adopted "no first use"
Carte Blanche: the June 1955 war game
Destroying Germany to save Germany
The escalation problem
Command and control in a nuclear war
MC 14/2: NATO doubles down in 1957
Shift one: rebuilding conventional deterrence
Shift two: nuclear weapons as coercion, not warfighting
A handful of weapons and the slippery slope
MC 14/2 vs. MC 14/3
Recap: how NATO moved away from warfighting
What this means for the US today
Conclusion

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MUSIC

"The Ice Giants" Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com)
Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 4.0 License
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Music modified (edited/remixed) from the original.

The False Promise of Tactical Nuclear Weapons | Episode 5

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