PAPod 621 - March 2015 - Safety Differently: Sidney Decker on Moving Beyond Blame

Hey, everybody, this is Todd from the future. I'm from the future. I brought back an oldie just because I wanted to do it. I have no reason other than I wanted to do it. This is from March 22nd, 2015. See how we have changed. See how we have grown up. Enjoy the pre-excellent podcast. I'm glad you're listening. You're going to love this one. Peace.

Hi, everybody, and welcome to the Pre-Accident Podcast. I'm your lovely host, Todd Conklin. Thanks for joining us today. Thanks for downloading, and thanks for subscribing, and thanks for all you're doing. It's been great. The numbers are huge, and today is a big day because my buddy, Sidney Decker, is our guest for the entire podcast, and it's a little bit longer than most, but I was going to cut into two, but it didn't make sense to cut into two.

It really hangs together pretty nicely as one solid podcast. Now, I have one goal for this podcast, and that's that you realize after you hear this just how available and accessible Sidney Decker is to the rest of the world. Decker, I think, has done some amazing things. He's the author of at least 10 books, 10 books that I know of, effective college professor, travels the world.

But what he's really done is as a moral and ethical goal for his life, taken on a very, very, very complicated argument with tradition. And he'll talk about this today. In fact, I'm sure we'll talk to Sidney Moore, but this podcast I think you're going to find really interesting. He talks a lot about just culture because he should and he needs to for us.

He talks a lot about accountability and discipline because I asked him to and then he talks a lot about, The way he thinks and in fact the tidbit of this entire podcast, Is his final words to us and he really does Help us understand Why this is such an important message and why we work so hard To make the world a better place, sit back and relax. I think you're going to find this podcast very informative.

But what I hope you find is this podcast is an opportunity to really get to know Sidney Decker a little differently than the words on the page. He's a wonderful man, a phenomenal father, a great husband, a tremendous guide, mentor, professor, and he's really thoughtful. And that thoughtfulness, I think, shows through in the next 30 minutes or so.

So without much ado, and with little fanfare as possible, this is Dr. Sidney Decker on the Pre-Accident Podcast. What led you to go into this safety stuff? Oh, it's been multiple events actually, Todd, but thank you for asking that question. Interesting question. The most recent engagements over the last two, three, four years in hardhat industries, oil, gas, mining, construction, have been driven mostly by my.

Move to Australia, which was driven largely by economic factors and opportunities for my wife and I in both of our respective fields. What I noticed after spending almost two decades working particularly in aviation and healthcare, and doing safety work there and research was that the The conversation in Australia is dominated and has been dominated very much by the industries that make up, the large part of the economy here.

And that is the hard-hat industries that I just mentioned. And what I found fascinating was that in worlds that are not necessarily as high-tech or as preoccupied with some of the assumptions and ideas that have been popular in aviation and healthcare. I was fascinated by how they do safety and by how much room there is for improvement and enhancement and expansion of some of the ideas.

The transition from going to seeing people as the problem to control to seeing them as a very important part of the solution that organizations need to embrace and harness, that was a new language. I recall about four years ago when we came to Australia, we gathered a bunch of thinkers around this, in a room, but it was almost like a smoke-filled room where we sunk in oaken shadows and huddled, and with closed doors and whispered the words of safety heresy, i.e. safety differently.

And today, Todd, what I find really cool is that it is more and more a legitimate call. We've got to do safety differently. We have come to the logical endpoint of getting even more improvements out of known remedies. And not that they're bad remedies, but they're not generating more improvements beyond where we already are.

And really interestingly, and that I never noticed when I was still working in Europe in these higher tech industries, is that the... You know, in a sense, you could argue that the safety profession in this country, has made more progress in terms of saving lives than, for example, oncology, right? And yet, if you say to a cocktail party that you're an oncologist, everybody says, oh, God, you're curing people, right?

And if you say you're a safety professional, man, they need a bucket to puke in, right? Because you get in the wherry and you're just part of the bureaucratic fascism that makes their life miserable. And yet we got all these successes to point to. And so that's an interesting question. How do we get there, right?

Now, I'm already blabbing beyond the original. Oh, no, no, go crazy. It's just a conversation. There's no wrong answers. We can't go wrong. Okay. So, but that at least paints the picture of the conversion into some of these other industries over the last couple of years. What was grad school like for you? When did you start having these kind of these safety differently ideas? And where do you think they came from?

Oh, the, interestingly. Okay. So, sorry, I mean, I really started thinking about this even before going to grad school in the U.S. I was doing a master's at Leiden and with, with none other than Patrick Hudson as my thesis advisor. And of course, Jim Reason plugged into that. This is the early nineties, in fact, 1991.

And I was very interested in the idea of procedure violations as I was a pilot and I understood all this stuff. And, you know, why don't we follow the rules? And then I moved to Ohio State, joined Dave Woods' lab to go get a PhD in 1992. And I wrote a thesis proposal for him that essentially asked, why do we keep violating procedures?

And at that point, he and his colleagues were writing a – students were – more senior students were writing the first version of Behind Human Error. Right, yeah. A great book, by the way. Yeah, it's a good book, which I then, you know, two decades later joined in rewriting and getting out under a new banner.

Sorry, same title, but second edition. But back to 92, Dave very carefully slipped me a draft chapter of Behind Human Error and said, why don't you look at that for a little bit? And it was all about adaptation. It was about human innovation. It was about people being a solution to a dynamic, complex world that will always outpace and outrun the rules that we build or the fixed guidance that we build to help govern it.

And it was revelatory. I read that and it was almost a Damascus moment or on the road to Damascus moment. Where not a conversion conversion, but, it just deepened the intellectual engagement with this and I think instilled with me or awoke within me, because that's probably more appropriate thought, it awoke within me a nascent, humanity and ethic that I have carried with me ever since, which translates very simply to the one, premise, which is that we have to assume that nobody comes to work to do a bad job.

Let's start there. Let's start there for heaven's sake. And if we do that, then a whole new field opens up of inquiry. If they didn't show to do bad things when they came to work, then we have to seek completely different answers for why things went wrong. How did we get to a place where people think that?

And I agree with you. And it's remarkable that there's this kind of underlying feeling that people are somehow bad. What do you think led us there? Yeah. My answer to that is going to be extremely long, about 400 pages, in the form of a new book, which I'm wrapping up the research for. But other projects have intruded as publishers are on my back.

But this one, I truly want to write the book soon about why we blame. And the question, Todd, isn't really when we started. The question is, how far back does it go? And it goes back all the way, all the way. The idea that we can and need to find single causes for bad events that have many causes, that have very complex causal histories, is something that we've been doing all along.

You can recognize this in the history of scapegoating, witch hunting, all the way through to 1960s, 70s, rational choice theory that dominated economics and also, populated psychology and still is visible in so-called just culture programs even today where we talk about people's choices, people's choices to do certain things, people's choices, to ignore a rule or to take unnecessary risk.

We frame that language in terms of personal choice. And so I think particularly the West has been dominated by a narrative in which personal choice and personal responsibility, you see this word very clearly in Weber's Protestant ethic, which goes back to John Calvin, who himself stands on the shoulders of St.

Augustine in the third and fourth centuries, who wrote very clearly about human choice being at the root of the creation of evil and suffering. If it weren't for human choice, Adam's choice or other people's choices, there wouldn't be suffering, right? Suffering can be traced back to human choice. And this has been the interpretation of our Western ethic for millennia.

And it lives on. It lives on in rational choice theory. It lives on in just culture models. It lives on in the way we do investigations. And so there's a big book to be written. And an interesting book for sure. I should hope so, yeah. Do you see big differences between North America, between Europe, between Australia?

Or are they becoming kind of seamlessly the same thing? No, no, no. In my experience, in fact, the differences are growing, have been growing since I went to grad school there in the early 90s. So let me try to give you some examples. The, I find, for example. Whenever I'm in Europe, which is, of course, where I'm there, understanding a healthy combination of liberalism, and personal responsibility, which translates very simply to, even though we think the opposite, but it translates to a typical lack, of rules where other countries would put rules in place.

For example, sending a kid off on a little field trip from school doesn't involve a fraction of the paperwork that it does here in Australia, for example. Australia now has the New South Wales as one of the states in this country. And it is the second most litigious place allegedly after California on the planet. And so that translates into a very desperate liability management, which introduces an amazing number of rules.

For example, the number of compliance workers. These are people who do nothing but help others comply, right? Do audits, do checks, come to my home to do a pool safety check, which I have to pay for and get a certificate for. Those are all compliance workers. Over the past 20 years, Todd, in Australia, the number of compliance, sorry, the proportion of compliance workers has gone up from about 6% to somewhere between 9% and 10% of the total workforce, right?

So, one in 10 people in Australia is a compliance worker today. Wow. It blows many people away, and it certainly concerns them down here when it comes to their productivity and competitive position in the world. As they're spending about $250 billion per year on compliance. And what's interesting is that only three-fifths of that, so $150 billion, is government-imposed.

It's still a lot of money, but $100 billion is self-imposed. It's clients going to contractors, contractors to the clients, clients among each other, companies as peers, industries. They all make up these rules that they have to comply with, you know, down to being, making sure that you individually wrap your tea bags before you actually serve them out in your, in your company kitchen, because otherwise there would be a risk of contamination, right?

I've actually seen paperwork and compliance demands around that in a organization, but it makes me very sad, right? If anything, because you dunk a tea bag into, into water that's just been boiled, right? Which tends to, you know, make short shrift of anything that could contaminate you, but this is beyond anything logical.

Now, that you wouldn't see in Europe, all right? And of course, I'm very much overgeneralizing, but so that's an important difference. It seems like snakes and other venomous animals in this continent that has been separate from the rest of the world for quite a while, geologically speaking. They have grown their own arms race, right?

We got seven out of the 10 most venomous snakes in this country, right, of the world. Which makes no sense other than understanding that this is such an isolated, far out of the way place that they develop their own ways of dealing with these challenges without being modulated by the rest of the world.

Now, then to the contrast with North America and in a sense, I see this even in Canada, although there is slightly more, to my understanding, liberal European type streak running through that country than there is in the U.S. In the U.S., there is a, I think a conservative turn that is very obvious in the way we manage safety.

And accountability in many companies. Let me give you an example. So 20 years ago, oh no, more than that. So early 90s, I joined a gliding club out in Ohio where I flew. I was an instructor. I became chief instructor. And it was just a grass field, farmer's field that we operated out of. And that was it.

15 years later, I came back and visited. And all across the field, there had been an absolute explosion of signs and warnings and disclaimers and things that'd be put up everywhere. You know, don't go here unless you have, right? Own risk, da-da-da. All kinds of ways to try to manage, not necessarily safety, but manage the liability associated with having that operation out of that farmer's field.

And that may be a minor and silly example, but I think the proliferation of an infatuation with just culture models across organizations in the U.S. Shows very clearly a turn away from system thinking, away from organizational thinking and back toward the accountability of the individual, which is, of course, very much what that very country was founded on. Right. Individual.

I wasn't what Ted Cruz said. You know, all you need is a is a man, a horse, a gun and an open field. Right. And that's you would not. I mean, to European mind, that doesn't even make sense. What does it even mean to an Australian? It hardly makes sense. Right. Because a horse, a gun and an open field in this country spells death within half a day. right? Because you need water, you need a hat, you need sunscreen.

Right, right. Exactly. So Australia is thinking about that differently too. But seriously, if that is a legitimate call to arms literally to make, in many parts of that country, it shows how much we rely on individual, robust individual accountability to make things happen and not make bad things happen that I think hampers a conversation around systems and how systems ultimately produce both good and bad outcomes through the interaction of many components, rather than just going back to a single individual. But it's a remarkable point you make.

The need for the sort of just culture models, and you're seeing them everywhere, they're popping up like flies, is really a pretty strong indicated that we're moving backwards, back towards that, that, the person has become somehow temporarily incompetent and we need to justly and fairly determine that in fact they were incompetent. That change changed.

It's scary to me because I think companies think that a just culture model is right on the cutting edge. It is new safety. It's a new way to view safety, and it's a new way to code it into their systems. What do you recommend? How does a safety manager have that conversation with his leadership when they want to move towards, you know, some kind of just culture model?

Right, right. Yeah, that's an important question, Todd. So here's what I would recommend in a short version. Is to, first of all, listen to those who either apply or to whom it is applied, the just culture model. Those who apply it sometimes tell me, oh, Sid, it's a great way to get someone fired. If you want to. I would agree. If you want to. I think you can muscle it in the direction you want to. That's what some workers are telling me.

Oh, our just culture model. No, it's a great way to get yourself fired. And as, in fact, one airline told me, you know, oh, no, we have a just culture. We just fire them. I think that illustrates it quite nicely inside of a single quote. If I were to counsel a safety manager on having a meaningful conversation with their senior management about how to do this well, it's.

To make sure that they understand that the justice that they are applying is, through a just culture model that, for example, asks, oh, was it an honest mistake or was it risk-taking behavior or was it negligence? And depending on the outcome, we will have certain consequences waiting for you, right? That sort of just culture model.

Again, based on the assumption of individual choices that preceded that bad outcome. And so I think it needs to be very clear that all that that does is just put shades of retribution on a judgment about somebody else's action. So it's a model of shades of retribution. How bad should the consequences be?

And it's really organized around three questions. The three questions are, what rule was violated, who did it, and what should the consequences be? And so, if you want to do retributive justice well, and we struggle with this as humanity for quite a while. The Romans tried to figure this out, and for their own citizens at least, because slaves were, of course, they had a different set of rules applied to them.

And Magna Carta, the first democracies of the world in Europe, tried to really struggle with this. And they found very quickly that if you want to do retributive just as well, as did the Romans, First of all, you've got to have an independent judge. The judge should not have a stake in the outcome, right? Well, companies screw this up the whole.

Time because often the manager or the supervisor is the judge. Well, they have a stake in the outcome, right? They don't want to look bad. So it already goes off the rails there. If you want to do retributive justice well, you need to have a second precaution. That is, you have to have a jury of peers. That is, you need to be judged by people who understand the dirty, messy nuances and details of your work.

Very often, that's not the case. You get judged by people who don't do that work, who don't understand what it means to practice and, in fact, pragmatically apply the rules. And the third precaution is that there needs to be a process for appeal. If there's no appeal possibility for you to say, hang on, I don't agree, this is a bad judgment, then it will never be seen as just, right?

Very few companies have meaningful appeal, right? You're already on the airplane out of the site in this country, for example, before you can even say a single word back. Boom. Right. There's no appeal. So. Again, what I find really interesting is that we seem as happy amateurs to apply retributive justice without any of the procedural and substantive precautions in place that many people in the West.

Have, and in fact, other parts of the world, have died for, taught, have fought for. And here we are, ignorant, ignorant of that entire history and thinking that we can, as amateurs, apply justice. So I have a completely different proposal, which is let's not worry about retributive justice. Let's move to restorative justice. And that asks three completely different questions.

If you want to do justice well, look at what South Africa did as they were trying to deal with the aftermath of apartheid, right? Awesome, awesome intervention. Convention, what they did was ask three questions. Who is hurt? What are their needs? And whose obligation is it to meet those needs? And that's how you create justice. First, ask who is hurt. And that can be first victims, second victims, the community, the organization itself, colleagues.

What are their needs? Because hurt creates needs, right? And needs create obligations. And those obligations need to be met. Sometimes, or in fact, in many cases, you could, in fact, ask the worker who has contributed to the accident to help meet those obligations. And in many cases, they're happy to do so. In fact, it allows them to restore, to redress, to be a stakeholder in the resolution rather than to be sent out of the site.

And so who's hurt? What are their needs? Whose obligation is it to meet those needs? I think that sort of model is going to create a more just world. So let me ask the question that I get a million times. What role does individual accountability have? At what point, when does discipline matter? These are really tough questions to managers just kind of starting on the safety differently journey. What do we say to them?

Let's not conflate discipline and accountability. I think that's the first mistake that we need to avoid. Accountability, we have a choice there. Every manager has a choice. So let's think about the word account. Is an account something that you want to make your people pay? Is an account something that you want to make your people settle?

In that case, you believe in retribution. They have something to pay. That is, their sin creates a debt and that debt needs redressing. And again, that's a model that we've run with for millennia. But you can also see an account as something that your people tell. You tell the account, right? And as you say, Todd, you can either learn or punish, right?

And if you want to listen to people's account, then you can't use that account against them and send them on a window seat, right? Send them off the site. And and so I think let's first make that choice. What do you believe accountability is? Is accountability something that you get people to pay or settle?

Is it something that you get people to tell, share their story, share their accounts? And they can do that in ways that that that, you know, we use these traditional words in the Western tradition. Right. Repentance. I really screwed this up. Let me explain how this happened. I've seen medical people do that, for example, even in front of their patients. Right. Right. Right.

There is there is repentance. There is an ultimately forgiveness is possible when you when you do that as a as a process, as a give and take. So accountability is not the same as discipline. Then to discipline. I still have to see that a process that precedes discipline needs to be procedurally just, and very often it isn't.

If you truly believe that someone isn't fit for a particular task because of what they have been involved in, then there's lots of questions to ask. First is, how did that person get into that role to begin with? Who trained them? Who was their mentor? What about, you know, human resources? What is their role in selecting the right people, right?

What about the supervisor? What about colleagues? What about the whole system around these people, right? Should we blame an individual for being mismatched in a job, right? And so So there's lots of systems questions to ask. If ultimately you want to go separate ways and say, look, you don't fit, it doesn't work, we really don't believe that you'll ever perform well in this job, You can do so or try to do so amicably, and you can certainly try to do so with procedural assurances in place, the ones we just talked about.

But also, don't stop there because there is an important lesson for your organization, for your system in that mismatch. How did it grow? How did it remain invisible for so long? Why didn't you pick up on the, as some schools of thought like to say, the weak signals that showed that that was the case?

And so it's never just the problem with a bad apple, right? The question that we need to ask, the main question is not, how do we get rid of the bad apple? No, no, no. The question to ask is, how did this apple become bad in the first place? Because that's something really important and deep about the system that you, manager, help govern.

Which is an amazing turn of events in management thinking. I mean, and it's fun to kind of watch that happen. Talk to me about safety differently. So first of all, most everybody that's going to hear this has read lots of your stuff. And I do want to get back to the field guide a little bit to talk about the third edition. But talk to me about Safety Differently.

What's that book done for you? What's it doing for the world? Oh, okay. So Safety Differently is, well, let me first, okay. So the first four sort of ideas, key ideas on which the book is based and on which it turns is, okay, so we need to go from seeing people as a problem to control to seeing them as a solution to harness. That's the first one.

We need to move from intervening in people's behavior to intervening in the conditions of their work if we want to make any change. We need to stop seeing safety as an accountability to the people above us, right, with managing numbers and look at my, you know, my injury rates have gone down, which is something you show up to, sorry, show to people above you as an accountability.

And in fact, rather than doing that, change it into a responsibility for people, an ethical responsibility for people. So, let me just go back. People are not a problem to control their solution to harness. Second, we need to intervene in the conditions of their work, not their behavior. Don't just tell them to try harder.

We need to change safety from an accountability up to a responsibility down. All right. And finally, we should stop seeing safety as the absence of negatives and start seeing it as the presence of positive capacities, which, of course, is very much consistent with with the safety to message that Eric Holnagel espouses, as well as the remark that you have, which is safety is not the absence of negatives, but the presence of defenses.

I don't like that defenses necessarily because it's too sort of structuralist and 1990s and too linear in my in my flavor. But we can talk more about that. Well, you know, I'll never leave the 90s. Look at my head. No, no, no, no, no, heaven forbid. But Todd, so those are the four principles on which it's based.

Then what the book is doing for me, to me, the data on that is hugely confounded because I write so much and I write so many books that if people come back to me and say, oh, I love your stuff. And I go, well, which book have you read? Oh, I've read your latest book. Well, which one is that? There's a new one every year, half year or so. Or another edition of an older one.

So as books go, I would not recommend Safety Differently to entry-level readers in the field. I would recommend very much either your staff or the field guide because it's much more friendly. Less philosophical, less ponderous. And so, you know, I had a lot of epistemological dragons to slay in safety differently. And in fact, I'm starting to wonder whether that is still appropriate. I mean, that was necessary.

There are some people in safety and human factors who will never, you know, buy what I have to say in that. And so I'm not going to convince them. So at some point, perhaps I'll have to stop being, trying to be the epistemological policeman of the field. Although I think it plays a really important role. I mean, that intellectual art just sort of legitimizing some of these ideas, even though I don't think they need legitimacy. I think the world is demanding some of that activity.

So I think it actually serves a good service. Okay. Okay. Okay. Fair enough. Yeah. At least, well, not the legitimating, but contextualizing. Yeah, contextualizing is a better word. Yeah, that's a much better word. So, and the new edition of the field guide. The field guide is masterful. And the journey that the field guide has taken has been really fun to watch.

The first one was really great. The second one was even better. And the third one will probably rock it and take it home. Thank you. Thank you. I think that, yeah, the third one. Well, okay. I've learned from Ed Hutchins that a book, you never finish a book. Yeah. You abandon a book. I agree. And so if you finish it, you'll never get it out because it's never done.

And so Ed was completely right when he said that. But what Tlaroso means is that as your views develop and change and evolve, particularly in interaction with the world that tries to apply some of the ideas in your book, you learn very quickly that, no, you're right, that book wasn't finished at all.

I got to go back and so add to it, take other things out, clarify things, finish thoughts that I started but didn't really sort of close in the earlier edition. And so it's nice for publishers to come back and say, well, let's do a new edition of this and reach out to the market that way. When it comes to the field guide for now, I am indeed very happy that it is saying what I wanted to say. It's, in fact, even picked up on some things that I left open in safety differently.

And I think, Todd, it will be a while before I write the fourth edition of the field guide, if ever. I have, however, just finished the third edition of Just Culture. Which is important, too. It's not out yet. It will take half a year or more for it to go through the whole process. But in which I make a much clearer distinction between the restorative and the retributive ways of doing a just culture in an organization because of the need that has risen, on the back of this increasing popularity of just culture models since I wrote the first book.

And your Just Culture book is an important book I mean, I think it's doing remarkable things And you know that, right? You know that to a great extent You've had really, really, really Very, very positive impact on the world And because of your ideas, We look at and manage safety differently Pardon the pun, or maybe pun intended, That's pretty remarkable Yeah, That's a really nice thing to hear at the start of a week. It really is.

Judging from, if I may call it fan mail. It's impossible to quantify the size of the impact. But that there are individuals and even some organizations that are starting to think differently or individuals who are treated differently as a result of some of those thoughts and ideas. Yeah, that data does come to me. And it's always extremely heartening and encouraging and, in fact, has motivated me to clarify things even better, to make it even more available. And so perhaps I should learn to stop writing and start podcasting.

Oh, yes. Anytime you want any hints on how to do a podcast poorly, I'm the person to talk to about this. So, Sidney, if you were to give advice to safety professionals, human factors professionals, a lot of pilots listen to this. What advice would you give them? I would repeat what the venerable and in some sense the foundational Jens Rasmussen once asked people about human error.

He said, look, if you don't understand why it makes sense for people to do what they did, it's not because they were behaving really strangely or bizarrely or erroneously. It is because your perspective is wrong. And I love that, right? What it means, if you want to understand why it made sense for people to do what they did, you got to put yourself in their shoes, all right?

It's, John Green calls it the Apache view, right? You wouldn't know this much better than I, obviously, but this is the story down here. The Apaches greet each other. They stand behind one another, put the hand on the shoulders, and look at the same thing, what's in front of the other person. So they share their view, literally, right?

They don't look at each other, but they share what they're looking at. That's what we would need to do if you want to understand why it makes sense. That's, I think, what's behind, in part, of course, Jens Rasmussen's exhortation. If you want to understand why even bad things made sense to people at the time, put yourself in their shoes. It's not because they were behaving bizarrely.

It's because your perspective is wrong until you can put yourself in their shoes and look through their eyes to understand what their world looked like. That's mighty sage advice. That's good to hear. What's next? Coming to the United States? Can we come and see you someplace? Yeah, thank you for asking. There's multiple appearances across the world.

I have an appearance in Canada in a few weeks. That will be the only North American wine in the short term. There's a bunch of European wines. It's still on my website, sydneydecker.com, but they keep coming up. There's always, as you know, Doug, more requests and invitations than we can say yes to. Oh, yes.

So we have to, and the calendar fills up about 18 months in advance. Then there is, I need to stay married. And there's, there's three, uh, you have the best family ever. You better stay married. I'd better stay married. Yeah. Don't screw that one up. The scientist wife. And so there's the logistical demands of making it all come together at the other end of the world with grandparents about 11,000 miles away, you know, which doesn't exactly make for easy, uh, easy, uh, kitty care. Yes. That doesn't make it hard.

We're doing something together in Copenhagen. Are we, are we on? We're on the docket together for something. April 2016, I think. Yeah. Yeah. That'll be fun. That'll be fun. We should certainly advertise that. Yeah. Absolutely. Well, thank you so much for your time. It is my pleasure, Todd. The pleasure was ours. We'll talk again later.

Thank you, my man. Thank you. All right. Well, there you have it. That's Dr. Decker, Sidney Decker. I thought it was a great conversation. I didn't get to say very much, but that's all right. Who wants to hear me? I really thought Sidney did a remarkable job. And I think hearing this once or even twice or even three times is probably pretty valuable.

Some bold stuff in there. I don't know if you missed it, but there's some bold stuff there around, I don't know, just culture and some of the use of matrixes and those ideas. All really important and a big part of what happens. Thanks for listening so much. Thanks for tuning in. Thanks for subscribing. Tell your friends. It means a lot. If you subscribe, for some reason, that's pretty important to everybody. So let's make that happen.

Until then, I'll talk to you in a week or so. I hope all is well as you have a marvelous time. Keep learning. Have fun. And for goodness sakes, be safe.

PAPod 621 - March 2015 - Safety Differently: Sidney Decker on Moving Beyond Blame

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