
Im Krisenmodus· Folge 130
U.S. Strike on Venezuela: Maduro Detained — What Comes Next
Mittwoch, 7. Januar 2026 · 29 min
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Shownotes
This episode was made with artificial intelligence.
U.S. airstrikes on targets in Venezuela; President Nicolás Maduro detained and taken to New York.
The government in Caracas reports fatalities, declares a state of defense, and denounces the action as an illegal act of aggression under international law. Is Venezuela facing regime change—or are repression, instability, and regional escalation looming?
In this special episode of our podcast Im Krisenmodus, FUNKE war correspondent Jan Jessen (nrz.de/politik/article410839483/us-angriff-auf…) speaks with Latin America expert Dr. Claudia Zilla (German Institute for International and Security Affairs, SWP) about U.S. motives, the drug trafficking allegations against Maduro, the logic of authoritarian regimes, the role of the military, international law—and what outcomes are realistically possible now.
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Guest
Dr. Claudia Zilla – Senior Fellow, Americas Research Division
German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin
Jan Jessen – Political Editor-in-Chief of NRZ; war and crisis correspondent
FUNKE Media Group
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🧭 Chapter Overview
1 – Attack and detention
U.S. airstrikes on Venezuela; abduction of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife; state of emergency in Caracas
2 – Drug trafficking allegations against Maduro
Why Venezuela does not play a central role in drug trafficking—transit routes, fentanyl, the Mexico–U.S. border
3 – Regime change ≠ democratization
Why detaining the country’s leadership does not automatically topple the system
4 – Public mood
Anger, grief, uncertainty: how the population, the opposition, and the regime are reacting
5 – Violence or fragmentation ahead?
The role of the military, potential repression, risks of internal power struggles
6 – Latin America & Europe
Divided regional reactions, concerns about U.S. hegemony, Europe’s dilemma
7 – International law & outlook
Why the operation is considered a violation of international law—and what will be decisive next
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🤝 More Information
German Federal Foreign Office
Current travel and security advice for Venezuela
Website: auswaertiges-amt.de
📬 Contact & Feedback
Questions, criticism, suggestions? Write to us:
✉️ krisenmodus@funkemedien.de
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Der neue Jahr beginnt mit einer neuen Krieg. Early Saturday morning, die Amerikaner attacken Venezuela mit massive airstrikes, targeting, among andere places, die capital Caracas. A US Special Forces Unit kidnapped die incumbent Präsident Nicolas Maduro und his wife und sie zu New York gebracht. Sie sind da für Terrorismus und Drogen-Trafikken.
Was ist in Venezuela jetzt passiert? Warum sind diese Angelegenheit jetzt und was ist die Hintergrund? Willkommen zu In Crisis Mode. Ich bin Jan Jessen, Politik-Editor bei der NRZ und War- und Crisis-Reporter für die Funke Media Group. Ihr könnt meine Reporten in den Funke-Titeln, including die NRZ, die Waz, die Braunschweiger Zeitung und die Berliner Morgenpost.
US-Präsident Donald Trump hat festgestellt, dass Venezuela-Präsident Nicolás Maduro wurde, mit seiner Frau. US-Troops haben die Venezuela attackiert, Explosionen wurden in Caracas gehört und eine State of Emergency wurde in der Lande gegründet. Europa ist auf die De-Escalation. Russia spricht von Arm-Aggression.
Und Iran hat auch die Solidarität mit Venezuela gespielt. Ich möchte das mit Dr. Claudia Ziller diskutieren. Sie ist eine Venezuelan-Expertin der Berlin-Based German Institute für International und Security. Vielen Dank, Dr. Ziller. Was bedeutet alles für Venezuela und für die internationale? Das ist die große Frage, warum diese so starke militärische Präsenz ist.
Das ist endlich die große Frage, warum es so heavy US-military Präsenz in den Karibben ist. What does all this mean for Venezuela and the international order? We now know that this was not merely symbolic, and that the pressure on the regime was not intended to be exerted solely from the sea, so to speak.
I don't think the people in Venezuela expected this. Venezuelans have become very accustomed to living through crises and dealing with threats. It has been part of daily political life for several decades, and I can understand why, during these times, people focus more on their private lives and their families.
Especially when it's unclear what is going to happen, when the future is an open question. It is difficult to even begin to process it. Wenn es nicht klar ist, was passieren soll, wenn die Frage einfach eine offene Frage ist, kann man sich damit auch schlecht auseinandersetzen. The U.S. accuses the Venezuelan regime of being largely responsible for the flood of drugs into the United States and has therefore classified the regime as a terrorist organization.
In recent months, there have been repeated attacks on alleged drug boats in the waters of Venezuela. Now Maduro, the president whom this special forces unit, apparently Delta Force, kidnapped along with his wife, is being charged in New York as a drug trafficker and terrorist. Is there any substance to these allegations?
This justification does not seem convincing to me. First of all, Venezuela does not play as central a role as a drug-producing country compared to other Latin American states, like Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia. For transit, Ecuador is much more relevant, because the main route from South America to the U.S. runs across the Pacific.
What leaves Venezuela by sea tends to go to Europe. Furthermore, the main drug problem in the US is fentanyl, which is transported across the Mexican border. Therefore, the argument is unconvincing. There is also counter-evidence. Trump pardoned the former president of Honduras, who had been sentenced to 45 years in prison for drug trafficking.
It just doesn't add up. Er hat wegen Drogenhandel für 45 Jahre Freiheitsstrafe bestraft. Das passt alles nicht zusammen. Naturally, one wonders, what is the real reason for this intervention? It is very difficult for us to discern the motivations of Trump and his administration. We only have clues based on their actions and justifications, which are often contradictory and not necessarily logical.
They don't form a clear picture where everything fits together. What is clear is that two other factors play a role, perhaps a major one. The ideological orientation of the Venezuelan government, the fact that it is a leftist, not a right-wing government, und die Wahrheit, dass Venezuela die größte Öl-Reserven in der Welt hat.
Access to raw materials is key. This variable was also explicitly mentioned in the US National Security Strategy, that the US intends to secure access to critical raw materials in certain regions within its own continent. Im eigenen Kontinent, die USA, sich den Zugang zu kritischen Rohstoffen zu bestimmten Regionen sichern will. So now people are wondering.
Maduro has been kidnapped. Yet we see the Venezuelan government still calling for resistance. Has the regime been toppled by Maduros kidnapping? Or is this just a symbolic event? The regime has certainly not been toppled. Only the leadership was kidnapped through a measure that violates international law.
The question is, what happens next? The regime does not consist only of President Maduro, but of a broad civil-military apparatus that is deeply intertwined and dominant in all areas of the state. The question now is, what will happen? Will there be fractures? How will various actors within the regime position themselves?
And how will the population and the opposition behave? What is your impression of how the population is behaving based on what you're hearing from Venezuela? There are reports from the US that Venezuelan exiles are celebrating the attack on Caracas. Aber in Caracas selbst, Menschen haben sich getrennt, um ihre Angst und Angst zu erinnern.
Menschen sind auch gesagt, dass sie in diesen Angriffen sterben, nicht nur Militärer, sondern auch Zivilisten. Exacte Figuren haben noch nicht gepubliert, aber es waren evidente fatalities. So, Menschen sind auf den Straßen in Caracas, um ihre Angst und Angst zu erinnern. Do you believe the majority of the population supports these attacks and believes the regime must go?
Or does the regime still have significant support? We know from surveys that the diaspora is generally in favor of intervention, even by military means. Wir wissen auch, dass die größte der Bevölkerung eine Veränderung der Regierung und sogar eine Veränderung der Regime. Aber es scheint nicht, dass eine andere Veränderung eine US-Militarre Intervention beherrscht.
Die Bevölkerung ist zwischen einer Veränderung der Macht und einer Intervention von einer foreign Super-Power. Machtwechsel und Eingriff einer ausländischen Großmacht. Und was ist die aktuelle Situation? Haben Sie keine Klarheit auf was passiert auf dem Boden? Was ist der Regime gerade jetzt? Ein nationaler Stadte der Defensivität hat sich gegründet.
Menschen haben sich gegründet, der Vizepräsident und der Vizepräsidentin, among andere. Die politische Liederschaft hat es sehr klar, dass sie das passiert als ein Akt von unjustifizierter militärischer Aggression verletzt. Jetzt natürlich die Frage ist, was ist die Mood zwischen den Menschen? Wie ich schon erwähnt habe, gibt es Informationen von Solidarität, Grief und Angst in Caracas.
Aber ist das ein Widespreader, oder ist es nur ein paar Regime-Supporters, während der restlichen Bevölkerung In der aktuellen Situation und in der kurzen Zeit erlaube ich mir kein Urteil darüber. Given the current situation and the short time frame, I wouldn't venture a judgment on how the general population views this, aside from the reactions you mentioned.
The Vice President and the Defense Minister have spoken, and there are calls for mobilization, though, so far, it is a mobilization of the armed forces and the colectivos, armed groups. I think a nationalist awakening cannot be ruled out, because, as I said, the population differentiates. They want the current rulers gone, but not necessarily by the hand of the U.S.
The decisive factor will be what happens in the coming days, how different factions of the regime position themselves, and how the opposition reacts. One fear among the population might be that they won't actually have a chance to shape future developments, that both the Venezuelan people and the opposition will be overshadowed by this intervention and the role of the US.
That is a fundamental concern. Also dass sowohl Venezuelanerinnen und Venezuelaner als auch die Opposition überschattet wird durch diese Intervention und durch die Rolle der USA. Das ist großzäglich zu befürchten. Das ist sehr interessant, denn wir hören ähnliche Dinge über den Iran. In Iran, wir sehen neue Proteste von Menschen die beide mit der ökonomischen Situation und der Regime questionieren.
Das ist nicht die erste Mal. Es passiert in 2022 and 2023. What we hear from the country is that people want democratization, but they don't want it imported from the outside or a regime change brought about by bombing. At least in Iran, people fear it could end up like Afghanistan, Iraq or Libya, where forced regime change led to chaos and instability that persists to this day, or in the case of Afghanistan, auch der Rückkehr des alten Regime.
Sie denken, dass Menschen so ähnlich haben, dass ein Regime-Veränderung durchbaut von Außenbomben könnte zu Chaos führen? Einmal kann es zum Chaos führen. Das andere ist, ob dann die nationalen Kräfte eine Chance bekommen. Firstly, it can lead to chaos. Secondly, there is the question of whether national forces will get a chance to shape the process.
And thirdly, what happens to the access to resources? Ich glaube, dass eine broad-majorität der Bevölkerung der nationalen Kleptokrasie the self-enrichment of the political and military elite. But I don't believe they would want to replace this with foreign interests siphoning off the oil. The claim to participation in that wealth, that oil production and exports should benefit the population and contribute to the country's prosperity, is something the people will not want to give up.
Darauf wir die Bevölkerung nicht verzichten wollen. Dr. Ziller, what needs to happen now? The opposition is holding back for the reasons you mentioned. But what would have to happen to actually achieve a regime change? Is it realistic? Also ein Regimewechsel erfolgt nicht einfach, indem die Spitze entführt wird.
Das setzt viel mehr voraus. A regime change doesn't happen just by kidnapping the person at the top. It requires much more, and there would have to be a clear break among the actors who sustain the regime. A majority, or a minority that controls the weapons, must be able to assert its will to transition to a different regime.
However, we should distinguish between regime change and democratization. Demokratization is much more demanding in long term. Regime change simply means the ruling regime is replaced, be it the person, the ideology, or the logic of governance. But that doesn't necessarily mean democratization. If someone from the political right takes over, but continues to rule undemocratically while simply maintaining different relations with the US, we would have to call it a regime change, but not necessarily democratization.
Not unless that government eventually relinquishes power and allows for free and competitive elections where the Venezuelan people choose their own leaders. Von einem Regimewechsel reden müssen, aber nicht unbedingt von einer Demokratisierung, wenn diese Regierung nicht irgendwann mal die Macht aufgibt und freie und kompetitive Wahlen zulässt und dann die venezolanische Bevölkerung sich ihre regierende aussucht.
Du sagst, dass es für Regimewechsel ist es notwendig, für diejenigen, die es anbringen wollen, zu bearmt. Das heißt, dass es interne Konflikte in Venezuela gibt. Do you believe the country is facing the threat of a civil war or at least an armed conflict? Also ich würde nicht vom Bürgerkrieg sprechen mit Betonen auf Bürgerinnen und Bürger.
Dann wäre so möglicherweise... I wouldn't speak of a civil war with the emphasis on citizens. It would more likely be regime factions fighting each other. Yes, though I don't see that immediately yet. I haven't seen any signs of it. Of course, the situation could develop very dynamically in the coming hours and days, and I might have to revise my interpretation.
It doesn't necessarily have to involve violence, but violence could play a part. The decisive factor is whether those who control the weapons, the armed forces, are willing to submit to the control of a new group. In Venezuela, such a group will always be civil-military at first. I can't imagine a purely civilian group emerging immediately to take control and issue orders to the military.
And so far, we've ignored the issue of basic services. This country isn't just about politics. Utilities must be kept running. The population needs food. Hospitals must function. The military is responsible for many of these areas. And the question is, whose orders will they follow? Die Krankenhäuser müssen weiter funktionieren.
Es gibt eine Reihe von Bereichen, wo das Militär tätig ist, wofür das Militär zuständig ist. Und die Frage ist, welchen Befehlen werden da gefolgt? US-Secretary of State Rubio said that with these airstrikes and the kidnapping of Maduro, the military operation is over. But if the Americans really want access to Venezuela's oil reserves or want to help forces into power that are more aligned with the US, then I don't think it ends here.
As you said, kidnapping the head of the regime doesn't automatically destabilize it. How likely is it that the U.S. will send ground troops? I don't know if we can assume ground troops, but I find it hard to imagine the U.S. Forgoing the chance to influence future developments. 1906. I believe what has happened so far will be followed by a claim to continue shaping Venezuelan politics.
How can that happen without some kind of military presence, either as the main actor or to provide backing to those the U.S. considers its friends in the country? Those are two possible scenarios for me right now. Um die Freunde in dem Land von den USA betrachtet zu unterstützen, um ihnen eine Rückendeckung zu geben.
Also das sind zwei mögliche Szenarien für mich jetzt. Was wird der Regime jetzt tun? Wir haben den Vizepräsident und den VfL. Die beiden sind sehr entscheidend. Sie sagen, sie werden die Revolution und die Länder'independenz und werden nicht tolerieren diesen Akt der Aggression. In den Medien wurde es als eine kolonialische Krieg beschrieben. Wie reagieren sie sich?
Militärer zurück wäre schwierig. Was wird passieren? Ich finde es sehr schwierig vorher zu sagen, ja, also militärisch hat Venezuela... It's very hard to predict. Militarily, Venezuela has little chance of retaliation against the US. But the question is, what happens within their own ranks? I have no insight into that at the moment. Whether we can still speak of the regime as a unit, or if cracks are appearing.
So far, I haven't observed a split, and the logical reaction was to appeal to nationalist sentiments and call for mobilization. But it's very difficult to create scenarios right now. Das Ansprechen der nationalistischen Gefühle und der Aufruf, sich zu mobilisieren und das Land zu verteidigen. Aber ich finde im Moment sehr schwierig, Szenarien aufzustellen, was demnächst passieren wird.
Und mehr Personal auf der Straße. Es gab Probleme für foreign Touristen. Ein Freund von mir war für wenige Tage in Caracas. Is an increase in repression to be expected? Damit rechne ich tatsächlich, denn ich verfolge Venezuela seit einigen Jahren, die Entwicklungen dort. I do expect that. I've been following Venezuela for years, and lately, whenever the regime felt under pressure, mostly from within, it responded with more repression, more arbitrariness, more kidnappings, arrests, torture and purges in its own ranks.
I expect that now as well as a desperate act. Und damit rechne ich auch im Sinne eines verzweifelten Aktes. The Latin-American neighbors likely won't ignore this. Millet, the Argentine president who was very close to Trump, celebrated. On the other hand, there was quiet criticism from Colombia. I imagine that countries across Latin America aren't necessarily pleased to see the US returning to the Sie sehen, dass Sie in den 70s und 80s verletzen sind. Sie sehen, dass Sie in den 70s und 80s verletzen sind.
Sie sehen, dass Sie in den 70s und 80s verletzen sind. Sie sehen, dass Sie in den 70s und 80s verletzen sind. Was ist Ihre Impression? Ist es horror oder joy? Unfortunately, wir sehen, dass wir heute schnell ideologisch verletzen sind. Governments close zu Trump welcomed it immediately, while those with tense relations, like Cuba and Colombia, reacted defensively.
But I think more relevant are the reactions based on international law. We need a clear stance, not just in Latin America, but in the international community, for international law and non-violent conflict resolution. Typical ideological reactions don't strengthen the rules we need for peaceful coexistence in the world. Vielen Dank.
You've called these actions a violation of international law. Why? The principle of non-use of force has very few exceptions. Self-defense or the responsibility to protect. But the latter requires a UN Security Council resolution, which does not exist in this case. In the case of Russia, the West reacted quickly. While you can't compare them directly, both involve a blatant breach of international law.
How must Europe react? To put it bluntly, do we have to sanction the US? Das erwarte ich nicht, dass Europa die USA sanktionieren, aber eine klare Verurteilung wäre wichtig. I don't expect Europe to sanction the US, but a clear condemnation would be important if multilateralism and international law are to be preserved.
This doesn't mean downplaying that Maduro is a dictator. We must treat even the guilty according to the law. We don't torture criminals just because they are criminals. Guilt must be proven in a proper process. We have these rules for difficult cases and for the treatment of those who themselves break the law.
We don't gain the right to break the law just because others do. My impression is that many states, in fighting evil, end up becoming like their enemies because they claim they can't stick to their principles to fight these criminals. That is fatal. Das ist wirklich die größte Gefahr für ein friedliches Zusammenleben.
Danke. Von Qasem Soleimani, Head of the Revolutionary Guards, oder Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, former Leader of ISIS. Both operations carried out under his watch. Trump also framed the operation as a response to Maduro being a narco-terrorist, claiming he had launched a drug-related campaign against the US and was responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Americans.
Yet, he was strikingly candid über die Rolle der Öl. US-Fürden, er sagte, würde innen, re-büren die Infrastruktur und verkaufen die Öl, für den Vorteil der Venezuelan Menschen. Er hat auch eine interessante Frage. Die US-Fürden würde das Land bis eine Stable Transition einigermaßen zu sein, obwohl er nicht klar war, wie.
Es gibt Menschen, er sagte, die das auf dem Boden machen können. Wenn gefragt, ob die Need für US-Troops, er hat nicht gewonnen. Wir sind nicht Angst, dass sie auf dem Boden haben, er sagte, an die Kommando-Förer, die Matur detained. Er hat gesagt, dass wenn Dinge nicht wie planiert, die US bereit ist, eine zweite, viel größere Waffe von attacks.
Sein Begriff war klar, dass wenn die USA nicht mehr Zugang an der Öl bekommen, oder wenn ein Regierung nicht installiert, die amerikanische Interessen folgt, könnte weitergehen. Aber die Detention von Maduro nicht automatisch bedeutet, Regime-Auswahl. Er ist nur der Herr von einem broaden, entrenzten Regime, ähnlich wie der Iran-System, mit vielen Offizienz beobachten von der Status Quo. So it's far from certain that events will unfold as Trump envisions.
As we've seen elsewhere, take Gaza's unresolved issues for instance, grand plans often run into reality. What will be decisive in Venezuela is whether fractures emerge in the civil-military apparatus and how the population and opposition respond. Unfortunately, people protesting could face repression, and the region is divided in its response.
Brazil's president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, has clearly condemned the operation as a violation of international law that could set a dangerous precedent for the region. Colombia's president voiced similar concerns, while Argentina's president welcomed the move. Many Latin American countries are wary of a U.S.-imposed agenda, and Europe now faces the challenge of responding to clear breaches of international law, regardless of political sympathies.
Invading a sovereign country without a U.N. Security Council mandate, abducting its president along with his wife, who cannot reasonably be held politically responsible, und sie zu New York ist, wie Dr. Ziller hat es, eine unmistakable violation der internationalen Wahl. Nachdem Maduro's removal ist, die Supreme Court hat Präsident Delcy Rodríguez als seine successor.
Sie hat die Willen zu engagieren in Gesprächen mit den USA. Aber Trump hat die Regierung in Caracas und anderen Ländern, including Colombia. Für jetzt bleibt es zu sehen, wie die Situation entwickelt wird. Wir hoffen, dass Venezuela die Escalation, civil war oder widespread violence und dass dieses Jahr nicht mit weiterer Konflikt beginnt.
Dieser speziell episode unserer Podcast, In Crisis Mode, wurde von Alexander Baumais, also ein Journalist an der Funke Media Group radio station. Alle Episodes sind auf Spotify, Apple Podcasts und YouTube. Neue Episodes sind meistens released.